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Summary
EMU raises entirely novel issues because a major currency union has been
formed in the absence of fiscal or political union. In fact, while monetary
and exchange rate policies are no longer decided at the national level, fiscal
policy of countries in the euro area will remain largely under the
responsibility of national authorities according to the principle of
subsidiarity. Nonetheless, fiscal policy will have to be formulated in the
context of the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact, which implies a
commitment to a medium-run budgetary stance close to balance or in
surplus. This thesis examines the desirability of both fiscal policy co-
ordination and precommitment devices for fiscal policy within this newly
established macroeconomic framework. Our analysis is based upon .the
literature of Time Inconsistency and the assumption that governments are
able to finance their public expenditures only by raising distortionary taxes.
It is conducted using two alternative scenarios. Under the first scenario
monetary and fiscal authorities set inflation and public expenditure
independently and simultaneously. Conversely, under the second scenario
governments set the tax rate before monetary policy is decided, therefore
behaving as leaders a la Stackelberg vis-a-vis the central bank. Our results
are in favour of co-ordination under the first Nash-game scenario. In this
casefiscal policy co-ordination eliminates the negative fiscal externalities of
open-economy policies on output, thereby reducing the optimal degree of
conservatism of the ECB. Conversely, when a particular choice for taxes
provides the fiscal authorities with a first-mover advantage, our findings
remain somewhat more ambiguous. In fact, on the one hand uncoordinated
fiscal authorities continue to overestimate the impact of a unilateral
increase in expenditures. On the other hand, however, lack of co-ordination
induces these to underestimate the strength of the central bank response to a
tax increase. This second effect is in fact desirable because it limits adverse
effects on expectations. Hence, our main result in chapter four is that co-
ordination remains desirable when open-economy effectsfrom fiscal policy
are sufficiently strong. Finally, the last chapter focuses on the political
economy question of how incentives to reform are likely to be affected
under the unique policy regime provided by the EMU. The analysis shows
that open-economy effects are - once again - pivotal for the determination
of the reform-gap between insiders and outsiders to the monetary union.
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Chapter 1
Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the European
Monetary Union: An Introductory Framework
Contents: 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 The Launch of the Euro; 1.3 The Monetary Strategy of the ECB; 1.4
Fiscal Policy and the Stability Pact; 1.5Summary and Thesis Outline.
1.1 Introduction
A vast amount of literature has been written on the subject of the
European Monetary Union (EMU), most of which concerns its
desirability and feasibility. National debates - particularly in the case of
the United Kingdom - have focused on the pros and cons of entry as a
cost and benefit calculation. For most Eurosceptics the major argument
against a common currency hinged on the view that Europe was too
heterogeneous - significantly more so than the United States - and
therefore too vulnerable to country-specific shocks, which could be
best dealt with by sovereign monetary policies and letting exchange
rates fluctuate.
While a good deal of this analysis remains relevant, more recently
the context has changed dramatically. The bilateral parities among
eleven European currencies have been irrevocably fixed and announced
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to the public on May 2, 1998; moreover, on December 31, 1998, the
same countries officially surrendered their monetary policy tool to an
independent monetary institution, the European Central Bank (ECB).
Indeed, it is the reality of EMU that has transformed the context. Far
from implying that these issues and concerns have actually been
answered, the creation of EMU has settled the policy debate among
members on whether Europe could afford to give up exchange rate
flexibility, and shifted the attention to find feasible and desirable ways
to make the system work more smoothly (Sachs and Sala-i-Martin,
1992).
It is true that a good deal of the EMU architecture is now in place.
The institutional structure of the European Central Bank (ECB) is
clear. The Maastricht Treaty sets price stability as the sole objective of
monetary policy and assigns to the ECB the task of achieving it. On
the other hand, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) imposes a ceiling
on the budgetary deficit countries can run, leaving some room for
countercyclical fiscal policy. Still, there is much that remains to be
determined. Above all, there are yet-to-be-resolved issues concerning
the role and conduct of fiscal policies. In fact, while monetary policy is
being delegated to an independent monetary authority, fiscal decisions
in Europe, at least for now, remain decentralised. They will continue to
depend on the fiscal actions of the eleven national fiscal authorities.
This makes the European Monetary Union a rather unique experiment,
significantly different from the one that characterises the United States.
Concerns have therefore been raised as to how EMU will cope with
what stands as a 'fiscal anomaly'.
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The main question this thesis aims to address is the following: are
these unusual approaches to fiscal and monetary stance mutually
consistent ? And if decentralised fiscal policies are a weakness, should
then fiscal co-ordination (or, alternatively, precommitment devices for
fiscal policy) be advisable?
In this thesis we argue that pressures may arise in the near future
that could move the balance in favour of greater fiscal policy co-
ordination. This is due to the fact that existence of open-economy
(relative price) effects from fiscal policy may induce governments to
loosen their fiscal stances for stabilisation purposes. This would in turn
seriously compromise the aim of price stability to be achieved by the
ECB.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 casts the
analysis of the launch of the Euro in the context of macroeconomic
convergence in Europe after the 1992 crisis of the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM). Section 1.3 provides a brief discussion regarding the
monetary strategy of the ECB, while section 1.4 concentrates on the
fiscal policy issues, highlighting some of the weaknesses that
characterise the excessive deficit procedure as it stands today. Finally,
section 1.5 summarises and sets out the plan of this thesis.
1.2 The Launch of the Euro
The move to monetary union m Europe became irreversible
because of the implications of what Wyplosz (1997) defined the
Mundell-Fleming's 'impossible trilogy principle'. This asserts that only
two of the three following features are mutually compatible: full capital
11
mobility, independence of monetary policy and fixed exchange rates.
The argument goes as follows. Under full capital mobility a nation's
domestic interest rate is tied to the world's interest rate. Since
uncovered interest parity holds, the country that wants to avoid
exchange rate fluctuations cannot allow its interest rate to divert from
the rest of the world. Hence this country de facto loses the
independence of its monetary policy. Indeed, this was exactly the
picture that characterised the European Monetary System (EMS) at the
beginning of the 1990s. By then a U-turn was no longer conceivable and
monetary union was perhaps the last and only chance for Bundesbank-
dependant European governments to collectively regain their
instrument of monetary policy.
Despite some initial tensions between Germany and France
regarding the appointment of the first ECB president, the launch of the
Euro on December 31, 1998 turned out to be almost a formality. The
Euro-currencies remained closely aligned for months making the
December 31 fixing a mere validation of the status quo. What was truly
remarkable about the birth of the euro was not only the smoothness of
the delivery, but also the fact that its eight-year gestation largely
followed the time-table and modalities agreed upon in December 1991
in Maastricht. This happened despite the European Monetary System
(EMS) suffering in 1992-93 its deepest and longest crisis and the
widespread scepticism about the prospects for European monetary
integration that immediately followed. Although at the time many
believed that the EMU project would be most likely postponed, the
premises for a successful achievement of EMU were indeed largely set
by the institutional response to the EMS crisis. This was rooted in an
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unresolved policy conflict between Germany and the rest of the system
on how to deal with growing price and output asymmetries - both
related to the shock of German unification and the cumulative effect of
persistent inflation differentials among member countries. The crisis,
which led to a widening of the fluctuation bands around central
exchange rate panties up to 15% in either direction, shattered all
remaining enthusiasm for the fixed but adjustable exchange rate policies
that had supported the concerted European disinflation efforts in the
1980s. It soon became clear that monetary stability and credibility
could no longer be borrowed from the Bundesbank and had to be built
domestically by other means. Specifically, countries needed to signal a
radical break with the past which only enhanced fiscal rectitude and
monetary policy reforms could provide.
What constituted a departure from the past was a stronger
domestic political consensus to participate in EMU, and therefore to
fulfil all the formal prerequisites established in the Maastricht Treaty
(Corsetti and Pesenti (1999a)). These prerequisites included complying
with the convergence criteria of the Treaty in terms of inflation, fiscal
stance, and interest rates, (see appendix lA) as well as appropriate
reforms to guarantee the independence of national central banks from
the local fiscal authorities. Within this framework, national monetary
strategies during the transition to EMU exhibited some country-specific
differences. Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and to some extent
Ireland and Portugal, retained an exchange rate orientation, while
France, Italy, Germany and Greece adopted some form of monetary
targeting. Finally, Spain, but also other non EMU countries like
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England and Sweden, embraced inflation targetmg as a new
comprehensive strategy to stabilise prices.
Fiscal policy also diverged but, in spite of the fact that most
countries adopted some cosmetic and temporary measures to pull the
deficit below the formal 3% limit established in Maastricht, the
European fiscal stance did show some fundamental improvements.
[Figure 1.1 here]
In fact, after the ERM crisis of the early 1990s, the deficit over
GDP ratios for the majority of EMU countries quickly converged
towards the Maastricht ceiling of 3 per cent. The most significant
progress was recorded in Belgium and Italy, whose figures had reached
a peak of respectively 10 and 6 percent at the end of the 1980s.
In a way, a common monetary policy preceded the birth of the
common currency. As the ECB was established in June 1998, it
engineered a co-ordinated cut of interest rates in December 1998 by all
national central banks to the common level of 3 percent (with the only
exception of Italy, which cut its rate to 3.5 percent only).
Overall, EMU was structured to guarantee as much continuity as
possible with the past, and notably with the most successful institution
that characterised it: the Bundesbank. This was seen as the key to
endow the newly created ECB with the anti-inflationary reputation
that characterised the German central bank.
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Where do we stand today? So far, the ECB seems to pursue Its
mandate in a balanced way, respecting its anti-inflationary objective
while adopting monetary policies that are appropriate for the cyclical
conditions of the Euro areal. The issue, however, remains to what
extent in the future it will be able to keep away from external pressures
to relax its monetary stance. Clearly, what matters here is not only the
degree of conservatism of the ECB, but also the fiscal stance of the
eleven member state governments.
[Fig.'s 1.2-1.3 here]
Looking at the official forecasts of both government deficit and
debt to GDP in the Euro-area over the period 1999-20022, all countries
are expected to remain below the SGP threshold for excessive deficits',
However, the largest economies will run medium-term deficits far from
the target of balanced budgets or surpluses (the forecasted deficits as
shares of GDP are 1% in Germany in 2002, 0.8% in France in 2002 and
1% in Italy in 2001). At the same time, debt to GDP ratios will fall
slowly for all EMU countries, although Italy, Belgium and - to a lesser
extend - the Netherlands will remain above the reference values.
Hence, for a scenario of near-potential growth and low interest rates,
the data suggest that the process of fiscal consolidation in Europe will
continue, but at a somewhat more relaxed pace. This confirms the
ECB's worry that the prevailing approach to fiscal stability in the Euro
area is becoming rather "minimalist", in the sense that there is an
1 See Corsetti and Pesenti (1999a).
2 May issue of the ECB Bulletin. Figures are based on the national programs of fiscal
consolidation of the EU member countries.
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attempt to comply with the letter of the SGP while ignoring its spirit",
Some serious concerns therefore arise. It might be true that, after the
drastic process of consolidation to meet the convergence criteria
required to qualify for EMU membership, the short term "minimalist"
approach is perhaps the only feasible option for several European
economies. Yet, serious problems may lie ahead if this trend of fiscal
consolidation stops or - worse - is reversed". This thesis identifies one
possible reason motivating this concern.
1.3 The Monetary Strategy of the ECB
The Treaty of Maastricht states that "price stability" is the primary
objective of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and
establishes that the ESCB is expected to support the general policies in
the ED (Art. 2) as long as this can be done without prejudice to its price
stability objective (Art. 105(1), see appendix 1B for details). The
definition of price stability is a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised
Index of Consumer Prices" for the Euro area as a whole of below 2%,
which is to be maintained over the medium run. The word "increase"
in the definition suggests that the ECB may also be concerned with a
"downward risk for price stability", in the sense that it might consider a
J (**) The 1999 promising forecasts have been confirmed by the actual values released after
this chapter had been written. Surpluses have in fact been registered in the following
Euroland countries: Ireland (+ 1.4%), Luxembourg (+ 1.1 %) and Finland (+ 2.6%).
4 In 1999 most Member States did not pursue an active fiscal consolidation policy, but
'relied on the beneficial effects of relatively strong revenue growth and lower interest
payments' (ECB Monthly Bulletin, March 2000).
S In an excellent seminal paper on the pros and cons of the SGP, Artis and Winkler
(1997) remind us of the huge debt build-up - unprecedented in peace-time - that
European countries have been able to accumulate in the past twenty years. Despite
the recent downward trend, the debt/GDP ratio has in fact nearly doubled in the past
15 years. This, they argue, suggests that sometimes neither the political process nor
the discipline of the financial markets is sufficient to induce governments to take
heed of the long run budget constraints.
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lower bound at zero inflation. The reference to the medium run
acknowledges that monetary authorities might be unable to control
short-run price variability and may show some flexibility in letting
inflation rise temporarily above 2% when the economy is hit by an
unexpected disturbance. It is important to observe that the definition of
price stability by the ECB differs in two ways from an inflation target
as usually understood: first, it is time and state-invariant; second, its
time horizon, the medium run, is not precisely quantified.
In addition to the quantitatIve definition of price stability, the
monetary strategy of the ECB consists of two "pillars": a reference
value for the growth rate of M3, and a broad assessment of the outlook
for future price developments . The reference value for the annual
growth rate of M3 is not to be considered a target - but a realistic
alternative to a monetary target. Hence, a deviation of current
monetary growth from the reference value, far from implying an
automatic policy reaction, would nonetheless prompt further analysis
to detect possible risks for price stability'.
There are three reasons why the ECB might be willing to consider
monetary indicators. The first is that monetary aggregates may provide
a more reliable guide for monetary policy in the Euro area as a whole
than has been the case in the past for single member states.
Econometric studies of the pre-EMU European economy (Angeloni et
al. (1994), Monticelli and Papi (1996)) show in fact that money demand
appears to be more stable in a larger European context than in any
6 This is essentially a CPI without interest costs.
"I'he ECB has chosen to announce a single reference value for M3 growth (4.5
percent), rather than a range as in the tradition of the Bundesbank.
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national environment, both in the short and the medium run. A second
reason sees the choice of mixing elements from both inflation and
monetary targeting as an implicit declaration that the ECB is unwilling
to commit to a specific strategy of monetary policy. This is due to the
fact that the ECB is aware that it will take time to develop some
understanding of the new economic environment and, specifically, of
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Europe. The other
reason is that even the availability and quality of data, while rapidly
improving, is still far from adequate. Hence, a monetary policy strategy
to be exclusively based on direct inflation targeting would be unfeasible
due to the difficulties of forecasting price developments in current
circumstances. A third argument is that the first pillar provides a public
sign of adherence to the tradition of the Bundesbank, under the
presumption that continuity in itself would enhance the ECB's
credibility. From this point of view, the larger the extent to which the
Eurosystem is able to signal continuity of strategy and behaviour
between its experience and the Bundesbank's, the richer the perceived
credibility accruing to the new institution.
The second pillar amounts to an analysis of a rather large list of
indicators of unequal status and nature. The ECB will in fact "evaluate
the full range of inflation forecasts produced by international
organisations, other authorities, market participants, etc., and will also
produce its own assessment of the future inflation outlook." (ECB
Monthly Bulletin, January 1999). But, at least for now, it will not make
its forecasts public. This attitude exhibits a striking resemblance to the
Bundesbank's, whose monthly and annual reports neither publish
forecasts of economic variables, nor discuss private sector forecasts. The
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ECB explains its decision not to publish its inflation forecasts by
arguing that giving prominence to a single official forecast would not
adequately reflect the actual decision-making process of the Council,
and would ultimately confuse and mislead the public. It is plausible
that, especially in the initial phase of EMU, the ECB does not want to
be evaluated as a forecaster and held responsible for any forecast errors,
given the considerable uncertainty which it is expected to face.
Finally, as regards transparency and accountability, the president
of the ECB holds a press conference immediately after the first meeting
of the Governing Council every month, providing an extensive
statement of the Council's analysis and deliberation. The analysis and
data in the ECB Monthly Bulletin, as well as speeches by members of
the ECB Executive Board, are also meant to supplement the president's
statement. Conversely, the voting records are kept secret, so that no
public statement exists on whether a monetary decision has been taken
unanimously or not. This feature largely conforms to the model of
"collective responsibility" - formally excluding any account of internal
disagreement. An annual and four quarterly reports on the activities of
the Eurosystem are submitted to the Council of Ministers, to the
Commission of the European Communities, and to the European
Parliament (EP) which then holds a general debate on the findings.
Members of the executive board of the ECB deliver testimony to the
committees of the EP, either on their own initiative or on the initiative
of the Ep8•
8 An open issue is to what extent the EP will be willing to exercise its powers, for
instance by putting pressure on the ECB to provide more information about its
decision-making process. This relates to the important issue of lack of democratic
accountability that many associate with the current structure of the ECB. Such a issue
is not addressed in this thesis.
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1.4 Fiscal Policy and the Stability Pact
While monetary policy lies in the hands of a 'pan-European'
central bank, fiscal policy firmly remains within the domain of the
member states. However, a number of rules and co-ordinating
procedures have been devised to limit discretion in the conduct of
domestic budgetary policies. These were finalised at the June 1997
meeting of the European Council of Amsterdam in a sort of 'post-
Maastricht' element": the much debated Pact for Stability and Growth.
The declared purpose of the SGP is to provide "both for
prevention and deterrence" in securing budgetary discipline while "in
no way changing the requirements for the adoption of the euro"IO. The
pact consists of two Council regulations, one on the Excessive Deficit
Procedure and another on surveillance. There is also a European
Council resolution providing guidance to the Council and member
states on the application of the SGP. The two council regulations have
the force of law. They clarify the meaning of the Maastricht Treaty's
provisions regarding excessive deficits, in particular with respect of the
exceptional and temporary circumstances under which the reference
value for the general government deficit can be exceeded without
incurring a penalty.
9 The Maastricht Treaty introduced requirements on fiscal policy as a condition for
suitable convergence and for eligibility for EMU membership. These requirements
were spelled out in terms of reference values for both deficit and debt over GDP
ratios and with forgiveness clauses to accommodate deviations from these targets
(details in appendices 1 A -B).
10 European Council 1997, Annex 1, II and III.
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Under the pact's provisions", participants in the monetary union
commit themselves to a medium-term budgetary stance close to balance
or surplus. The budget concept referred to is taken to represent a non
cyclically adjusted position. Thus the pact can be read as calling for
countries to reach a position in which shocks will not carry the actual
deficit past the reference value of 3 per cent.
The pact will automatically consider a deficit in excess of 3 per cent
to be exceptional only if a country's GDP declines by at least 2 per cent
in the year in question. A recession in which real GDP declines by less
than 2 per cent but more than 0.75 per cent may still qualify with the
concurrence of the Council. The country, however, will have to show
that its recession was exceptional in terms of its abruptness or in
relation to past output trends. Finally, countries with annual output
declines smaller than 0.75 per cent will not be able to claim exceptional
CIrcumstances.
There are further provisions which make the application of the
excessive deficit procedure somewhat more discretionary than it might
appear at first glance. While countries are obliged to correct excessive
deficits as quickly as possible after their emergence and to launch the
required corrective budgetary adjustments without delay, they will
probably be able to run deficits in excess of 3 per cent for at least two
years in a row without incurring a fine. The Commission will in fact
receive definitive data that a country's deficit in year t exceeds 3%
around March of year t+ 1. By the end of May it will have issued a
recommendation for eliminating that excess in accordance with Art.
11 See appendix Ie for details.
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103(4). The country will then have to take corrective action such that
the excess is eliminated by the year t+Z, If no corrective action is taken
by the end of year t+ 1, financial sanctions will be imposed. But,
presumably, corrective action that will eliminate the excess in year t+2
will suffice to eliminate this threat. Thus, two successive years of
budget deficits in excess of 3 per cent will in fact be permitted. Observe
that an additional element of flexibility is given by the passage in the
Amsterdam Treaty referring to the above time limits and ending with
the qualifying phrase runless there are special circumstances'. No
clarification, however, is provided as to what is meant for such 'special
circumstances' .
Sanctions, when required, will take the form of non-remunerated
deposits, which start at 0.2 per cent and rise by one tenth of the excess
deficit up to a maximum of 0.5 per cent of GDP. Additional deposits
will be required each year unless the excessive deficit is corrected. In the
absence of corrective measures for two consecutive years, the deposit
will be converted into a fine; otherwise it will be returned.
The EMU fiscal target provisions have led to a considerable
amount of debate, focusing on the relative merits of a more stringent or
flexible interpretation of these criteria. Arguments in favour of such
provisions are usually drawn from either political economy or public
choice approaches identifying a deficit or public expenditure bias in the
political decision-making process. Such a view tends to be shared by
economists who are sceptical about the efficiency of fiscal policy
interventions and by those interested in reducing the role of the state in
the economy more generally. The story ofte~ put forward here is that
22
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number of studies regarding Europe, then deficit ceilings represent a
rule-based partial substitute for fiscal policy co-ordination 13.
Other aspects of fiscal spillovers concern:
• the crowding out of investment from mounting government debts
originating from the uncontrolled use of public expenditure for
stabilisation purposes;
• increase in default risk m a member country which leads to
expectations of an implicit bail-out or a systemic financial crisis
across the union;
• external exchange rate appreciation which crowds out other
member countries' net exports (Carlberg (1999)).
Along with the theoretical debate concerning the desirability of
measures restricting the discretionary conduct of fiscal policy in a
monetary union, there are several practical issues regarding the current
set-up of the stability pact that are starting to be addressed. The first is
that the strict application of the rules contained in the SGP could
increase the incentive to classify more spending as off-budget, deflecting
energies from genuine consolidation. In this regard empirical evidence
from the United States (Bayoumi and Masson (1995)) suggests that
states with the most stringent rules also display the largest increases in
off-budget forms of spending over time. Indeed, in the European Union
itself, reclassification of expenditures and one-off measures did
contribute in many countries to compliance with the Maastricht deficit
convergence criteria in 1997. Hence, to prevent such practices from
proliferating, accounting rules may need to be strengthened further.
13 An excellent survey on the empirical studies on fiscal transmission is provided by
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Secondly, by focusing exclusively on the size of the fiscal imbalances,
the SGP as it stands today completely overlooks the composition of the
deficit". We know, however, that fiscal adjustments relying primarily
on wage and transfer cuts are by far more successful than cuts in public
investment as far as deficit reduction is concerned. Alesina and Perotti
(1996) showed that such cuts may in fact have an expansionary impact
in the short run. Therefore, the main recommendation from this line of
argument is to formulate any deficit target in terms of a structural
deficit rather than an actual deficit (Eichengreen (1997)). Unfortunately,
as Artis and Winkler (1997) point out, the problem with adjusted
deficit targets, besides disputes about measurement, is that unlike the
combination of 60 per cent debt and 3 per cent deficit targets in the
Maastricht treaty, they provide no reassurance at all about long run
sustainability of public finances.
1.5 Summary and Thesis Outline
After many years of experimentation 10 monetary policy co-
operation in Europe, EMU has been heralded as the endpoint of the
long-lasting search' for financial stability. Judging by its early
performance, monetary union is indeed delivering on its promises. In
fact, despite the quite substantial depreciation the Euro has experienced
uis-s-uis the US dollar and indeed the GB pound, overall the historical
break induced by the creation of the single currency has not brought
about the kind of financial and systemic instabilities many had worried
about.
Douven and Peeters (1997).
14 See Corsetti and Pesenti (1999a).
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Yet, with EMU under way, the problematic issues of the
relationships of the individual countries with a common monetary
policy move into the spotlight of attention. One might argue that there
should be no problems at all. A conservative and independent ECB will
simply ensure low and stable inflation, while individual countries will
select their preferred fiscal policy. However, two observations are in
order. Firstly, even though the ECB is quite independent and attaches
great importance to price stability, it is likely that a degree of sensitivity
to broader economic developments will remain. Accordingly, under
special circumstances, events might suggest that the ECB might
temporarily compromise its price stability objective. Secondly,
undisciplined budgetary policies might endanger the anti-inflationary
stance of the European central bank by raising inflationary expectations
and hence the inflation bias, and this despite the. independent status of
its members. Lax monetary policies would in turn reduce the
credibility of the ECB's commitment to price stability unless a
mechanism existed for the monetary authorities that is optimal but
time inconsistent.
It is quite obvious that the monetary stance and credibility of the
central bank will not be independent of the fiscal stance of the eleven
national fiscal authorities which have joined EMU. In other words,
fiscal irresponsibility, in the form of excessively expansionary fiscal
policies, could jeopardise the ECB's commitment to price stability. The
questions then are: in a framework of the type that characterises the
present set up of EMU, is fiscal policy co-ordination desirable?
Specifically, what is the impact of co-ordination on both the monetary
performance of the ECB and its optimal degree of conservatism?
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Moreover, how do precommitment devices for fiscal policy affect
incentives to reform the labour market in a monetary union as
compared to outsiders with full fiscal discretionary power?
This thesis aims to provide an analytical framework to study these
issues. We believe that a useful starting point is to refer to the literature
on Time Inconsistency and argue that fiscal policy co-ordination
becomes desirable if it reduces the kind of social inefficiencies
traditionally identified by high inflation and distortionary taxes.
Although this literature provides us with a useful theoretical
framework to develop our analysis, it does present us with a number of
limitations. Firstly, the problem of time inconsistency has most
intensively been studied within the context of monetary policy. In fact
most conventional macroeconomic models specify carefully the
connection of monetary policy to the evolution of the price level, while
ordinarily leaving both the government budget constraint and fiscal
policy entirely hidden. Despite the attempt made by Sargent and
Wallace (1981) to demonstrate that sufficiently irresponsible fiscal
policy will cause problems for monetary policy, so far the fiscal issue
has been treated as no more than an important footnote to the central
role of monetary policy. We acknowledge that, only more recently,
some economists have begun to take the view that fiscal policy plays a
role at least as important as monetary policy in determining the price
level. Development of this view has required new models and new
forms of analysis. However, the great limit of these models remain two:
they either adopt a simple ad hoc IS-LM framework (Alesina and
Tabellini (1987) and subsequent developments), or they are based upon
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rather complicated structures (for example Krichel et al. (1996)). These
mainly rely on microeconomic foundations which are often unable to
provide analytical results. Simulation techniques are therefore required.
An additional limit of this literature, and in particular of the one
dealing more specifically with strategic issues in a monetary union
(Cuckierman (1992), de Grauwe (1994), Eijffinger and de Haan (1996),
Giavazzi (1988) and Persson and Tabellini (1994)) is that it contributes
only marginally to the understanding of the relationship of countries
after monetary union has taken place.
Starting from the more traditional models of monetary policy, in
this thesis we endogenise fiscal policy and introduce an explicit
balanced budget constraint. Our aim is to concentrate on the important
macroeconomic policy interactions that are likely to characterise the
EMU in the coming years. In doing so, we attempt the difficult task of
striking a balance between too-much ad hoc macroeconomic models
and more complicated models almost entirely relying upon simulation
techniques. Our aim is to develop an analytical structure which,
although derived from microeconomic foundations, is kept as simple as
possible. Its task should be to illustrate the fiscal and monetary policy
interactions in a monetary union characterised by countries which are
very integrated, their central bank likely to be highly inflation adverse,
and where fiscal authorities are unable to finance public consumption
by making extensive usage of the debt channel.
A distinguishing feature characterises our analysis. The derivation
of our model from microeconomic foundations leads to a reduced form
for output which differs from the more traditional output equations in
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one lmportant respect. Along with the well know inflation surprise -
originating from the monetary authority's inability to precommit - ,
we derive an additional element standing for relative public expenditure
surprises. This is obtained from the assumption of existence of open-
economy (relative price) effects from fiscal policy as in Levine and
Pearlman (L&P 1998). Moreover, within this framework, we study the
important distortionary effects of both income and VAT taxes which
are neglected in L&P IS.
Two mam theoretical models summanse our analysis on the
desirability of fiscal policy co-ordination. The model presented in
chapter three relies on the assumption that monetary and fiscal
authorities move simultaneously, therefore taking the action of their
counterpart as given. This means that, while decentralised fiscal
authorities set the domestic level of public expenditures, monetary
authorities simultaneously set inflation for the entire union. The
assumed nature of the welfare function of the monetary authorities,
however, requires the latter to take adequate account of the tax
distortions affecting the economy as a consequence of the tax financed
expenditure programs of the fiscal authorities. We show that, for a
sufficiently strong ECB sensitivity to the general output level,
important externalities are transmitted on inflation by excessively loose
domestic fiscal stances. This is likely to happen when fiscal authorities
operate non co-operatively because they may perceive traditional
demand-side (open-economy) policies as able to increase their domestic
level of output: in this case a public expenditure bias is said to arise.
Fiscal policy co-ordination, or alternatively institutional
15 Tax distortions are ignored in L&P. They in fact assume taxes to be lump-sum in
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precommltment devices like the stability pact will eliminate these
externalities bringing about a second best result. The first best would
of course be attained if both policymakers were able to precommit to
optimal paths for inflation and public expenditures, but this is excluded
a priori. Another interesting result that we derive is that the optimal
degree of independence of the central bank is higher with
uncoordinated fiscal policies. This happens because, to the extent that
national authorities engage in expansionary and inflationary fiscal
policies, the union central bank will have to pursue a tighter monetary
policy in order to get closer to its bliss point for inflation.
In chapter four we extend the analysis by relaxing the assumption
of simultaneity in the policy formation process. We therefore set up a
modified model which is based on the assumption that fiscal authorities
behave as Stackelberg leaders uis-a-uis the central bank, in the sense that
a particular choice for taxes gives them a first-mover advantage. We
argue that such a modified game theoretical structure is able to capture
more elements of the real world because it is grounded on the more
realistic assumption that fiscal authorities are relatively slow in
delivering their policies while monetary authorities adjust more easily
to the cyclical disturbances. Unfortunately, a closer-to-reality theoretical
structure does bring about more ambiguity in the results. In fact, if on
the one hand the impact of a unilateral increase in expenditures
continues to be overestimated without co-ordination, on the other
hand uncoordinated fiscal policies underestimate the strength of the
central bank response to a tax increase, which is now internalised. This
second effect is desirable because it limits adverse effects on
nature.
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expectations. Our main finding is therefore that co-ordination remains
desirable if open-economy effects from fiscal policy are sufficiently
strong.
Finally, in chapter five we use the extended ins & outs model of
inflation and public expenditure developed in chapter three to analyse
how monetary union in Europe is likely to affect labour market
reforms. We show that the relative strength of the open-economy
effects is once again pivotal for the determination of the results.
Specifically, these are in line with the mainstream literature saying that
reforms are higher in countries preserving their monetary policy
independence only when open-economy effects are negligible.
Conversely, if the latter are sufficiently strong, such incentives are in
fact higher under the monetary union.
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Chapter 2
Time Inconsistency:
A Survey of the Literature
Contents: 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Time-Inconsistency Problem: Rules versus Discretion; 2.3
Rogoff's Conservative Central Banker; 2.4 Recent Extensions of Rogoff's Conservative Central
Banker; 2.5 The Principal-Agent Approach; 2.6 Controversial Issues; 2.7 Models with Endogenous
FiscalPolicy; 2.8 Conclusion.
2.1 Introduction
Early theory of macroeconomic policy dealt with the economic
consequences of given policy rules. The approach was that knowledge
of such consequences and of the policy objectives would automatically
lead to the selection of the optimal policy rule. Implicit in this
approach was the assumption that policymakers are passive agents
whose only task is to implement the optimal policy path once
identified. Lack of success of this theory in explaining both the way in
-,
which policymaking is carried out in practice and why inflation has
been higher in some countries rather than others has gradually changed
the focus of the more recent theory of economic policy. Meanwhile, a
new literature - identified as literature on the time or dynamic
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inconsistency - has developed emphasising the analysis of the policy
formation process.
This chapter aims to provide an extended - although necessarily
selective (given the vast number of contributions) - coverage of this
Time Inconsistency literature.
Its outline is as follows. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 introduce the problem
of time inconsistency. Section 2.4 illustrates the argument of the
conservative central banker as originally proposed by Rogoff, and
section 2.5 presents the more recent developments based upon this
theory. Section 2.6 reports on Carl Walsh's contractual approach, while
section 2.7 concentrates on more recent theoretical works where fiscal
policy has been endogenously treated. Concluding thoughts are
contained in section 2.8.
2.2 The Time Inconsistency Problem: Rules versus
Discretion
The concept 'of time-inconsistency was first formalised in economic
theory in 1977 to describe the temptations that policymakers face to
deviate from a policy rule which has been previously announced. This
field of macroeconomic policy, known also as rules versus discretion
literature, has developed following two premises. The first premise is
that current decisions depend not only on the current states of the
world, but also upon expectations of future events. However, since
these enter as a constraint in the optimisation problem, an optimal
policy rule at the beginning of a planning time period may no longer
remain optimal at a latter date. When this happens, the policy is said to
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be time (or dynamically) inconsistent. The second premise is that
macroeconomic policy is better understood as the outcome of strategic
interactions between the government and the private sector of the
economy. This means that the optimal decision rule for the
government depends not only upon its own decision but also upon the
decisions of any other player in the economy. Hence, the maintained
assumption that macroeconomic policy decisions are the outcome of a
game played among rational agents has made game theory the
methodological tool adopted by this modern approach to
macroeconomic policy.
Kydland and Prescott (1977) were the first to illustrate the time
inconsistency phenomenon. Their argument may be briefly stated using
a simple two period example. Assume that the policy-maker at time
t=l is to maximise an agreed-upon social objective function
(2.1)
where X = (xj>x2) are policies at time t= 1,2 and Y = (Yt>Y2) are the
corresponding sequence of economic agents decisions subject to:
YJ =/J(xJ,xn
Y2 = 12 (YP XI> X2)
(2.2)
(2.3)
where x; denotes rational expectations of X2 formed at time t= 1.
Assuming differentiability, the first order conditions for the optimality
of U are:
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(2.4)
(2.5)
The ex ante optimal (control) policy is obtained by solving the five
equation (2.1)-(2.5) system in Xl ,X2 ,Yt>Y2'
By contrast, the solution provided by dynamic programming
begins in period 2 and starts by evaluating the policy at time two (x2),
given Xl 'Yl and the constraint (2.3). This means that the first order
condition for X2 is:
(2.6)
Comparing (2.6) with (2.5) it is immediately clear that the two
expressions are equivalent only if the effect of X2 upon Yl is zero
(if I/a2 = 0 ) or if the direct and indirect effects of Yl and Y2 on U are
exactly offsetting. Kydland and Prescott refer to the policy sequence
{XI,X2} - provided by dynamic programming - as consistent, a term that
the literature has subsequently changed to time-consistent. It follows
that:
Definition
A policy is (time) consistent if,Jor each period oj time t, it maximises (2.1), taking
as given previous decisions, and that Juture policy decisions are similarly selected.
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The implications Kydland and Prescott derived from the above
two period problem were essentially two-fold. First, the dynamic
programming method does not provide an optimal policy sequence,
since, in general, it does not satisfy the first order condition for the
maximisation of U. Second, optimal control theory - although
powerful and useful technique for analysing dynamic systems - is an
inappropriate tool for economic planning even when there is a "well-
defined and agreed-upon" fixed social objective function. This derives
from the fact that current decisions of economic agents depend in part
also upon their expectations of future policy actions. Thus, optimal
control theory would be appropriate only if these expectations were
invariant to the future policy plan selected. Observe that what is
required here is not necessarily that agents can forecast the future
perfectly, but that they have some knowledge of how policies will be
modified as a result of changing economic conditions Secondly, the
discretionary (i.e. time consistent) solution for which policymakers
select the best action given the current situation will not typically result
in the social objective function being maximised. Conversely, by
relying on "simple and easily understood" policy rules, policymakers
are able to improve their economic performance". Kydland and
Prescott are very clear in this regard. The reason why policymakers
should follow rules rather than discretion
".. is not that they are stupid or evil but, rather, that discretion implies selecting
the decision which is best, given the current situation. Such behaviour either
results in consistent but suboptimal planning or in economic instability." [K.P.,
JPE 1977, vol. 85, no. 3, p. 487].
16 Observe that, unlike Friedman's (1948) argument, this does not depend upon
ignorance of the magnitude and timings of the effects of policy.
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The problem of time inconsistency was subsequently popularised
m the monetary policy game of Barro and Gordon (1983a). They
postulated a supply function for aggregate output which implies that
real output only increases with unanticipated inflation. In such a
framework the policymaker is viewed as attempting to maximise an
objective that reflects society's preferences over inflation and output.
Their findings were that, although the government in period one may
adopt an anti-inflationary policy, it has a clear incentive to reverse
policy in period two in order to engineer surprise inflation and increase
output. Yet, a rational private sector fully understands the
government's motive to increase output by creating surprise inflation.
As a result it incorporates a positive mark-up into its inflationary
expectations such that they are now sufficiently high so as to give the
government a disincentive to further stimulate output. The long-run
result is that output remains at its natural rate while inflation becomes
much higher then the socially optimal level. An inflation bias is
therefore said to arise. This is computed as the difference between the
lowest enforceable inflation rate and the ideal rate.
It is important to observe that the existence of an inflationary bias
relies on the assumption that policymakers are not able to commit to a
particular action in advance. If a precommitment technology existed,
the inflation bias would disappear. At the beginning of the planning
horizon the government could in fact commit to a zero-inflation rule
and the inflationary expectations would adjust accordingly.
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The fact that discretionary monetary policy gives nse to an
inflation bias naturally raised the question of what could be done to
avoid or at least mitigate this problem. A number of alternative
solutions have therefore been proposed along the years.
One potential solution to the credibility problem has come from
Giavazzi and Pagano (1988). They argued that a high inflation country
may enhance the credibility of its own monetary policy by pegging its
exchange rate to the currency of a low inflation country. The
convergence of inflation rates during the 1980s in Europe through the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) suggests that this particular theory
may have been quite effective for some time. The main problem with
this solution remains that fixing the exchange rate may not be always
feasible given the difficult task of finding suitable low-inflation
countries to peg the currency against. An additional problem is that
such arrangements are always vulnerable to speculative attacks
(especially when capital controls are being relaxed). The 1992-1993
crisis of the ERM remains a well known example.
In a completely different context, a number of authors (including
Fischer and Summers (1989), Devereux (1987)) have argued that
monetary time-inconsistency can be rather easily overcome by indexing
labour contracts to the price level. Their argument is that with wage
indexation the Phillips curve becomes steeper, and the government is
less tempted to create unanticipated inflation since this now has to rise
to a much higher level to achieve the same reduction in unemployment.
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An alternative and more popular approach was offered by the so
called 'reputational literature'. Barra and Gordon (1983b) have
extended their previous paper (B&G, 1983a) to examine whether
reputational considerations can restore the credibility policy-makers
need to pursue time-inconsistent policies. The basic idea is that if the
game 1S repeated over time, a government might have incentives -
namely poor reputation as reflected in an upward revision of
inflationary expectations - to persist with a low inflation policy.
Specifically, Barro and Gordon assumed that whenever private agents
observe an inflation rate different from the one they anticipated, they
will expect the policymaker to act only in accordance with his short
run incentives for some time in the future. They will therefore raise
their inflationary expectations. Hence a trigger strategy can be assumed
to be put in place to create a trade-off for the policymaker. He gets a
current benefit by driving up inflation above its expected value, but he
has got to balance this against the cost of higher inflation in the future.
This implies that the computation of the lowest enforceable inflation
rate requires the policymaker making two calculations. On one hand he
has to compute the gain from reneging on any policy announcement.
This involves weighting up the cost of higher inflation and moving
away from the ideal inflation rate against the gain of generating surprise
inflation and moving nearer to the target level of output. This first
calculation is what Barro and Gordon refer to as temptation. On the
other hand, the second calculation involves comparing the cost of being
able to pursue the same inflation policy rule in the next period as
opposed to being forced to follow the higher discretionary inflation
rate. The discounted value by which the cost of discretionary policy
exceeds the policy rule is referred to as enforcement. The outcome of
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such a cost and benefit calculation is that a range of announced inflation
rates can be an equilibrium. Such a range crucially depends on how
heavily the policymaker discounts the future and on how long the
reversion of high inflationary expectations last. Yet, the important fact
remains that endogenisation of future costs (deriving from reneging on
promised policies) by the policymaker helps him relax his short-run
incentive constraint. As a result:
"some monetary rules, but generally not the ideal one, can be enforced by the
policymaker's potential loss of reputation ....Specifically, the outcomes are superior
to those under discretion -ubere no commitments are pertinent· but inferior to
those under the ideal rule" [Barro and Gordon, JME 1983b, pp. 99-100]
While the framework set up by Barro and Gordon clearly
illustrates the potential role of reputation in monetary policy, it does
present two major weaknesses. The first is the implicit requirement
that all the private agents somehow co-ordinate on a particular strategy
for revising their inflationary expectations when the policymaker
deviates from the expected inflation rate. The second is that the
revisions of expectations are assumed to occur whenever private agents
face a broken promise by the policymaker, however small and in
whichever direction.
Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1996a) tried to shed some light on this last
criticism. Adopting a weaker notion of renegotiation, they introduced
the concept of "chisel-proof credibility" by asking, if the central bank
cheats just a little, will the public be still willing to punish? They
showed that the lowest inflation rate that can be supported in this case
is positive but inferior to the discretionary rate.
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2.3 Rogoff's Conservative Central Banker
The discussion of rules versus discretion also encompasses the topic
that deals with the viability and sustainability of independent central
banks as an alternative solution to the time inconsistency problem. In
this regard, the seminal contribution remains the one by Rogoff
(1985a). He investigated the effects of delegating monetary policy to an
independent authority concluding that:
"it can be entirely rational for a society to structure its central bank in such a way
that the monetary authorities have an objective function very different from the
social welfare function. Whenever a distortion causes the time consistent rate of
inflation to be too high, the society can be made better off by having the central
bank place 'too large' a weight on inflation rate stabilisation". [Rogoff, Q.J.E.
1985, vol. 100, p. 1184]
His argument can be illustrated by using a stripped down version
of the Barro-Gordon model" .
Let output be gIven by a supply equation In which only
unexpected changes in the money stock have real effects:
(2.7)
where Jr and Jre are, respectively, actual and expected inflation and
G is an aggregate productivity disturbance. The principal feature of the
model is the assumption that, because of tax and labour market
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distortions, the equilibrium level of output is below the socially
optimal level. For simplicity, we can denote with y the target level of
output and with b the positive difference between this and the natural
rate. We further assume that the government preferences can be
summarised as:
(2.8)
where a is the relative weight the government places on inflation
stabilisation versus output stabilisation. The first term in (2.8) captures
the idea that the government is dissatisfied with the market determined
level of output while the second term represents the cost of inflation.
As in Kydland and Prescott, the government is unable make binding
commitments to low inflation and is motivated to generate unexpected
inflation in order to expand economic activity. In order to construct
the discretionary equilibrium, we need to derive the Nash non co-
operative solution by backwards induction. This gives the well known
result:
b e1[=----
a 1+a
(2.9)
The first term is the inflationary bias, while the second represents
the monetary response to unexpected disturbances. This discretionary
equilibrium satisfies the following two conditions. Firstly, private
sector expectations are on average correct, in the sense that 1[e is always
17 The macroeconomic model underlying our subsequent analysis is deliberately
stylised because we wish to highlight the gaming aspects of monetary policy rather
than the technicalities of the transmission mechanism.
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the optimal forecast of actual inflation. Secondly, although it is at the
discretion of the government to fool the private sector through surprise
inflation, the latter sets its inflationary expectations sufficiently high so
that the marginal cost of inflating equals the marginal gain from
increasing output. Hence the government is not motivated to inflate
further. Observe that, if the fiscal authorities were able to commit to a
policy rule, than a simple rule of zero inflation would eliminate the
inflationary bias whilst still allowing flexible responses to shocks. In
our specific case, the optimal policy rule would have the following
form:
• Ii
ff =---
1+ a
(2.10)
So far nothing new. We have quite simply formalised the issues
which have been illustrated in the previous section.
Using a framework very close to the one above derived, Rogoff
suggested to mitigate the time inconsistency featured in (2.9) by
appointing an 'independent' central banker to conduct monetary
policy. By independent it is meant that the central banker places a
greater weight on inflation stabilisation than the government does.
Formally, this is equivalent to letting the central banker's loss function
be:
(2.11)
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where ;r is the endogenously determined extra weight placed on
inflation stabilisation. Under this modified setting, the equilibrium rate
of inflation can be shown to be:
b 8
Jl'=------
a+;r l+a+;r
(2.12)
Comparing the first two terms of (2.12) and (2.9) one can
immediately see that, for any ;r >0, the inflationary bias with a
conservative central banker is lower than the bias delivered under a
discretionary equilibrium. Note, however, that this comes at the price
of a trade-off between commitment and flexibility. In fact, if increasing
;r reduces the time consistent average inflation, the same increase also
reduces the stabilisation part of inflation that aims to mitigate the
impact of the supply shock on output. In fact, as ;r approaches infinity,
the counter-cyclical feedback coefficient in (2.12) approaches zero and
the result is that the central bank ends up responding completely
inappropriately to shocks.
The next step in the analysis was to compute the optimal degree of
central bank independence. This is given by the point where the
benefits of reducing the inflationary bias outweighs the costs of
responding inappropriately to supply shocks. Rogoff proved that the
expected value of the government's loss function is convex in ;rand
that there exists a positive optimal value of it that minimises this
function. To see this intuitively, suppose that r=o. Then, the central
bank would be stabilising the economy optimally on the one hand, but
the economy would be suffering from inflationary bias on the other
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hand. Hence, it would be possible for a government, by raising the
central bank' s weight on inflation stabilisation, to achieve a first order
stabilisation gain at a second order stabilisation cost. At the other
extreme, if X goes to infinity, then the inflationary bias would be
eliminated but the loss due to output variability would be very high.
Thus, for a very large X the marginal cost of reducing X is small
relative to the stabilisation gain. Hence, it is optimal for the
government to choose an agent to head the central bank who places a
greater, but not infinitely greater, weight on inflation stabilisation than
the government does.
We conclude this section with an important observation. The
Barre-Gordon (1983 a,b) and Rogoff (1985a) seminal papers are usually
cited when discussing the case for central bank independence. Yet, it is
important to observe that the policy implications of these works are
rather different. Barro and Gordon argue that the inflationary bias
under discretion makes a case for a monetary rule. In their initial non
stochastic equilibrium, the optimal rule would fix the money stock or
money growth rate. Once uncertainty is introduced and the level of
output is affected by shocks, it is optimal to set up a feedback rule, in
which monetary policy responds optimally to shocks. This would be a
rule without discretion, but there would be no need for an independent
central bank. In fact it would only require a technical institute to
implement this rule. Conversely, Rogoff's solution to the need for
flexibility for monetary policy to respond to shocks is to install a
conservative central banker with the discretion to respond to shocks
and the conservatism to keep the mean rate of inflation low. Hence, the
optimal central banker is chosen by trading off the reduction in mean
46
inflation secured by conservatism against the less than optimal trade-off
between inflation and output variability produced by the same
conservatism.
2.4 Recent Extensions of Rogoff's Conservative Central
Banker
Rogoff's model has been quite influential as it is evidenced by the
number of researchers who have used it as an analytical framework for
investigating further the macroeconomic effects of delegating monetary
policy to an independent authority.
A first development has originated from the observation that in the
rather rigid framework devised by Rogoff the government is quite
simply unable to override a decision taken by a central bank enjoying
such a great deal of autonomy. Lohmann (1992) relaxed this assumption
using a model of delegation in which the central bank sets the inflation
rate while allowing for a flexible escape clause implemented in extreme
situations. The set-up is similar to that in Rogoff except for an
additional term in the government's loss function. This extra term is an
endogenously determined cost that the government pays when it ex post
overrides the central bank's monetary policy decision. The timing of
events is described as follows: Firstly the government appoints an
inflation averse authority to run monetary policy and also sets the cost
of overriding a central banker. Then the private sector sets nominal
wages. Finally the shock is realised and the central bank sets the
inflation rate. The government either accepts this inflation rate or it
chooses the option to override the central bank and reset a new higher
inflation rate. In the latter case, the government would achieve an
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chosen before the outcome of elections but who implements monetary
policy right after the election date, has two benefits: it reduces the
inflationary bias, but also eliminates politically induced output
variability since monetary policy is not under the direct control of
governments with different preferences. The elimination of policy-
induced output variability may compensate for the increased economic
variability caused by the fact that an independent central bank does
not try enough to stabilise supply shocks. This of course strengthens
the case for central bank independence, especially in countries
experiencing partisan political business cycles.
Along the same lines but in a more public finance framework, van
der Ploeg (1992) has made a case for delegating monetary policy to an
ultra-conservative central banker, namely to someone who cares only
about price stability. This is due to the fact that in an economy with
nominal wage contracts and nominal public debt, a government has a
temptation to create unanticipated inflation in order to erode the real
value of debt service and hence to cut distortionary taxes. Under
discretion, this results in an inflation bias and in a suboptimal
government revenue mix that relies too much on seignorage revenue
and too little on taxation. Van der Ploeg has shown that a fully
independent central bank committed to price stability yields a higher
welfare than a dependent central bank. He has also shown that a fully
independent central bank is more likely to be preferred when the stock
of outstanding nominal government debt is high, when a large
proportion of wages is not indexed and when the extent of the black
economy and collection costs of conventional taxes are insignificant.
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2.5 The Principal-Agent Approach
One of the most promising contributions to the recent literature
on central bank independence has come from Walsh (1995). His main
innovation is to adopt a principal agent framework in an attempt to
analyse the incentives a central banker may face in a standard monetary
policy game. In a principal-agent framework, the principal
(government) delegates control over inflation to an agent (central bank).
The principal's task is to offer the agent a contract providing the
incentives to enact the policy desired by the principal. The positive
aspect of the contract is that it does not modify the central bank's
preferences about output stabilisation. Hence, it completely eliminates
the credibility vs. flexibility trade-off Rogoff's proposal suffers from. The
issue then becomes choosing a suitable contract which can be taken as
credible by the private sector.
The set-up is the natural rate model examined above. But in contrast
to Rogoff's approach of viewing the central banker as more inflation
averse than the rest of society, in Walsh's model the government offers
the governor of the central bank a state-contingent wage contract and
his objective is to maximise the budget transfer from the government
which in turn depends on inflation and unemployment. Formally, let
the central bank's objective function be:
(2.13)
where ir and yare the target levels of inflation and output
respectively. Aggregate supply and output is given by the Lucas supply
function:
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(2.14)
where e is, as before, an aggregate supply shock with zero mean
and finite variance, y is the equilibrium level of output in the absence
of supply shocks, and x , Jl'e are the actual and expected inflation rates,
respectively. As it is often the case in monetary policy games, it is
assumed that the market determined level of output y is below the
target level of output .9 (.9 = y + k; k > 0). The informational structure
assumes that, firstly, expectations about inflation are formed, secondly,
the monetary authority observes a signal fJ about s and it finally sets
the inflation rate based on this. The signal is private information of the
central bank. Suppose now that monetary policy is delegated to an
independent central banker who chooses the inflation rate in order to
maximise his utility given by U = t - LCB' where t is a monetary
transfer payment from the government conditional on the central bank
performance as specified in the contract. Given the incentives and
constraints faced by the government and the central bank, the
interactions between the two can be regarded as a standard principal-
agent problem. More specifically, the agent sets the inflation rate to
maximise his expected utility, conditional on the realisation of fJ The
principal's problem is to design a transfer function t that enforces the
central bank to choose Jl'= n{ fJ) so that E(t - LCB) ;;::o. The transfer
function t(Jl') implements the optimal policy n{8) if this maximises
E[t(Jl') - LCB]/8 for all 8. Intuitively, the government's objective is to
design a contract that eliminates the inflationary bias while leaving the
central bank free to respond to fJ.
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Walsh has shown the optimal policy can be implemented by the
following transfer function:
(2.15)
(2.15) states that the central banker is penalised for deviations of
actual inflation above target inflation le and rewarded for actual
inflation rates below such a target. Notice that the penalty is linear in
actual inflation, which means that the marginal cost of increasing
inflation is the same for all realisations of (J.
If the work of Walsh sets the stage for the contractualist research
agenda, Svensson's inflation targets bridge the gap with the reality of
monetary policy-making. Svensson (1995) observed that if the central
banker puts a lower average inflation target than the rest of society does
and its preferences over inflation and output are quadratic, this is
formally equivalent to adding a linear cost to inflation, as in the Walsh
model above. Moreover, he shows that the trade-off between average
inflation and output variability arising in Rogoff's model only follows
from the particular parameterisation of preference differences, namely
that the central bank puts more weight on stabilising inflation than the
rest of society does. Svensson's proposal is therefore to assume that the
central banker has a lower average inflation target than the rest of
society. In such a case, average inflation can be reduced without any
increase in output variability.
We believe there are two alternative interpretations of this result. If
the central bank may be held accountable, a target 1S a non-
distortionary performance-based contract. Alternatively, Svensson's
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proposal may be viewed as a suggesuon that monetary policy be
delegated to a genuinely conservative central banker, that is, a banker
who implements non-distortionary responses to shocks but prefers an
average rate of inflation lower than the socially optimal one.
2.6 Controversial Issues
Several issues arise at this point. The first regards the distinction
between discretionary and rule-based behaviour. How does one decide
whether a central bank's behaviour should be classified as discretionary
or rule-based? Within a simple model one could calculate the settings
implied by each type of behaviour, or simply observe whether inflation
exceeds its target value on average. But such steps are not possible for
an outside observer, since she does not possess knowledge of the bank's
true target values -much less the response coefficients that would be
implied by each type of behaviour given the implicit model of the
economy. Taylor (1993) explicitly addresses this problem in practice,
recognising that no actual central bank would be likely to follow
literally a simple formula for its instrument settings, but contending
that the distinction could be of importance nevertheless.
Clearly, being systematic is a necessary condition for the rule-like
behaviour, but even those central bankers who defend discretionary
behaviour do not think of it as unsystematic. Accordingly, McCallum
(1993) argues that being systematic it is not sufficient and points out
that even discretionary behaviour can be accurately represented by the
systematic application of a simple formula. The needed additional
criterion, McCallum suggests, is that
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"the monetary authority must also design the systematic responsepattern (soas) to
take account of the private sectors expectational behaviour" [McCallum 1993,
JME]
This leads us back to the main point that central banks have to
avoid temptations to re-optimise over time.
A second and perhaps more controversial issue is whether it is
actually feasible for an independent central bank to behave in a rule-like
fashion. Many authors (including Taylor (1983), Taylor (1993),
McCallum (1995) and Prescott (1977)) have in fact suggested that, since
there is no tangible "commitment technology" to guarantee that future
choices will be made similarly, independent central banks are inevitably
destined to behave in a discretionary fashion, making a fresh
optimisation calculation each period. One of the strongest explicit
statements of this position has been made by Chari, Kehoe, and
Prescott (1989) as follows:
"we should emphasise that in no sense can societies choose between commitment
[and) time-consistent [i.e. discretionary} equilibrium. Commitment technologies
are like technologiesJar making shoes in an Arrotu-Debreu model-they are either
available or not" [Chari, Kehoe, and Prescott, 1989, FRB Minneapolis, p.
303]
Moreover, Lapavitsas (1997) observed that the 'independent'
central bank of the theoretical models is not a central bank at all. It is,
rather, a social planner armed with a single instrument of economic
policy, fiat money, in pursuit of the aim of price stability. With this in
mind, 'independence' acquires a meaning: it is, above all, the
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independence of the social planner from the executive branch of the
state, i.e. the periodically elected government .
The third objection regards a matter of internal consistency of the
theory of central bank independence and is rather more substantial.
McCallum (1995) claims that the literature "features inappropriate
interpretative mappings between analytical constructs and real world
institutions". Two are the fallacies which he identifies. The first regards
the assumption that if the central bank is not externally constrained to
do otherwise, it will generate the discretionary rate of inflation. He
argues that, although no technology exists for inescapably committing
future actions, this does not imply that such behaviour is actually
unfeasible. In this regard he argues:
"What is needed for avoidance of the inflationary bias isfor the central bank to
recognise the futility - on average, over extended time spans - of continually
exploiting expectations that are given 'this period' but reflect responses to actions
of the central bank taken in the past, and to recognise that its objectives would be
more fully achieved on average if it were to abstain from attempts to exploit these
temporarily-given expectations".[McCallum 1995, AER]
Therefore, the actual issue remains whether the commitment
equilibrium without incentive constraints is implementable. The
second fallacy pertains to the inappropriate interpretation of the Walsh
contracts. In McCallum's own view, the unsatisfactory feature of this
result is that such a contracting device does not actually eliminate the
motivation for dynamic inconsistency. It merely relocates it to a
different place". Specifically, under the proposed arrangement, the
18 The same point has been made by al-Nowaihi and Levine (1996).
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government would have to enforce the contract by reducing the central
bank's budget when inflation is high. However, the government has
exactly the same incentive of the central bank not to do so. What this
means is that, if the absence of a precommitment technology is a severe
problem, then it must apply to a consolidated entity consisting of the
central bank and the government together, just as it would to an
entirely independent central bank. Therefore, his conclusion is that the
problem cannot be overcome analytically by a suggestion that the
central bank's objective function should be specified at the
constitutional stage of the political process. In fact, the constitution
still needs to be enforced, and the enforcing party may be subject to the
same temptations of an independent central bank. Hence, the main
effect of central bank contracts
"... is not principally to constrain the central bank to act in accordance with the
government objectives, but rather to constrain the government by increasing the
difficulty of its bringing pressure to inflate upon the central bank". [McCallum
1995, AER]
The problem remains, however, that contracts may raise
credibility relative to simple arrangements only to the extent that
renegotiation costs are sufficiently high (Waller, 1995). The practical
calibration of the Walsh tax, particularly when this is imposed as a non-
pecuniary penalty, is of course another crucial issue.
A final objection, largely emphasised by Alesina (1988), Alesina
and Summers (1993), Bade and Parkin (1984), Eijffinger and Shaling
(1993), Grilli et at. (1991) and Cuckierman et al. (1992) among the many
others, is grounded on the consistent empirical result of the free lunch
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provided by central bank independence in industrialised countries. In
fact, central bank independence appears to be empirically associated
with smaller rates of inflation, while carrying no costs in terms of
growth 19. Furthermore, both the variance of inflation and output
growth are on average lower for countries that have more independent
central banks. These results do not seem at first glance consistent with
the predictions of Rogoff's model, which implies that central banks
trade off between output and inflation variability. Fischer (1995)
suggests three explanations of this. First, that more independent central
banks are better at stabilisation than less efficient banks, and therefore
come closer to the stabilisation-efficiency frontier. Secondly, that fiscal
policy is more disciplined in countries whose central banks are
relatively more independent. Finally, that both inflation and output
performance are primarily affected by shocks that differ from country
to country. Alesina and Summers (1993) and Alesina and Gatti (1995)
argue that this empirical result may also be explained by the fact that
independence eliminates the uncertainty created by a polarised political
system. In their own view, because the political conflict produces
inefficiency in the determination of output and prices, delegation of
monetary policy solves the problem by eliminating the political source
of macroeconomic instability.
2.7 Models with Endogenous Fiscal Policy
The main limitation of these earlier models is that they exclusively
deal with monetary policy. In other words, they completely neglect the
interplay between monetary and fiscal policy. More recently, however
- possibly also as a response to the magnitude and duration of fiscal
19 These results only hold for developed economies.
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deficits experienced in many developed countries - a perhaps more
interesting branch of the time-inconsistency literature has tried to fill
this gap.
The earliest paper on the subject to receive a great deal of attention
was the Sargent and Wallace (1981) piece entitled "Some Unpleasant
Monetarist Arithmetic". The principal contention here is that an
economy's monetary authority cannot prevent inflation from rising if
an uncooperative or irresponsible fiscal authority behaves so as to
generate a continuing stream of primary deficits.
The workhorse paper in the monetary-fiscal interaction literature
is the one by Alesina and Tabellini (1987). They developed the Barro-
Gordon model by assuming that real government purchases are
controlled by a fiscal authority that may have different objectives -
concerning the level of these purchases as well as inflation and output -
than those of the central bank. The fiscal authority's revenues come
from non-lump-sum taxes and money growth, government debt being
excluded from the model. Using this setting, Alesina and Tabellini
derived outcomes pertaining to both discretionary and rule-like
behaviour by the central bank. Their most striking result was that,
when the preferences of the central bank and the fiscal authority are
sufficiently different, equilibrium outcomes with monetary policy
commitment can be inferior to those obtained under discretion. This
result, which was viewed as a message in favour of monetary and fiscal
policy co-operation, has been subsequently confirmed by the two-
country extension of Bryson et al. (1993).
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There have been several attempts to improve upon the framework
devised by Alesina and Tabellini. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995), for
instance, extended their framework using a more sophisticated budget
constraint allowing for public debt. Within this modified setting they
analysed the implications of alternative institutional arrangements -
centralisation versus decentralisation, N ash versus Stackelberg - for
society's welfare. Unfortunately, their results were somewhat
ambiguous. In fact, different arrangements were preferable depending
on society's preferences over inflation, output and public spending as
well as the structural parameters of the economy.
A less ambiguous result was derived by Agell et al. (1996).
Developing an analytical structure very similar to the one of Beetsma
and Bovenberg, they showed how discretionary fiscal and monetary
policies are bound to result in excessive inflation and deficits. With
particular reference to public debt dynamics, they stressed how, in a
finite game where there is no binding borrowing constraint for the
government during its term of office, the equilibrium will be
characterised by sustained deficits. Conversely, with binding borrowing
constraints there is a bias in running debts initially.
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) reconsidered the original structure
of Alesina and Tabellini in a multi-country model of monetary union,
and modelled the fiscal authorities as Stackelberg leaders vis-a-vis the
central bank. Within this framework each fiscal authority acted
strategically, perceiving that the output distortions caused by a tax
increase would have been partly offset by an inflation surprise. Because
rational wage setters were able to anticipate this, the advantage of the
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policymaker once again resulted in an inflation bias. The conclusion
was that fiscal co-ordination in a monetary union is not desirable
because it strengthens the bargaining position of the leader.
Yet, the work by Beetsma and Bovenberg neglected the existence
of open economy-effects from fiscal policy and possibility that fiscal
authorities might be tempted to use so called 'demand side (i.e. public
expenditures) policies' to increase output. This issue was discussed at
great length in the paper by Levine and Pearlman (1998). They analysed
a hypothetical closed trading bloc of ins and outs to a monetary union
where both fiscal and monetary authorities are subject to time-
inconsistencies. If on the monetary side the source of inconsistency is
represented by the temptation to deliver a rate of inflation well above
the one expected by the private sector, on the fiscal side a stabilising
role for the fiscal authorities is given by the pressure these can exert on
the real exchange rate. The argument goes as follows. When a
government fiscal stance is looser relative to that of the others, its real
exchange rate appreciates. This reduces the real product wage therefore
raising the domestic level of output. Yet, a domestic appreciation is
equivalent to a domestic depreciation for the rest of the other countries,
with opposite effects on their levels of output. Hence, fiscal policy is
beggar-thy-neighbour because it increases the level of output at home at
the expense of foreign countries' welfare. One of the weaknesses of this
line of analysis, however, is that it fails to account for the effects on
output of both a distortionary taxation and an endogenously
determined balanced budget constraint. Moreover, it is still grounded
on the assumption of simultaneity in the policy decision process.
61
A negative externality connected to the use of fiscal policy in a
monetary union is also derived in Sibert (1992). Here the negativity of
the sign relates to the fact that an increase in one country's tax lowers
disposable income in the same country, therefore decreasing seignorage
in the area as a whole. Thus, the lack of fiscal policy co-ordination
causes income taxes to be too high. As a consequence, the provision of
the public good is too high and the central bank sets inflation below the
optimal level. Yet, the result that lack of international co-ordination
results in too little inflation is unusual and contradicted by Miller and
Salmon (1985), Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) and Levine and Brociner
(1994) among the many others",
Finally, there have been several attempts to extend the
contractualist approach suggested by Walsh to the case where fiscal
policy is endogenously treated. It is worth mentioning here the one by
Huang and Padilla (1995). They showed that, if fiscal policy is
endogenous, a contract a la Walsh offered to an independent central
banker remains subject to strategic manipulation by the government.
As a result, a suboptimal Nash equilibrium may emerge, in which
distortionary taxation is too high while inflation is too low. Hence,
implementing the optimal policy mix would require that either the
central banker has primacy over the fiscal authority, or the fiscal policy
is delegated to an independent authority also subject to an optimal
contract.
20 It is not the aim of this survey to enter into the debate of the sign of the
international transmission of fiscal policy. However, from a number of more
empirical researches conducted during the past decade (an excellent survey is provided
in Douven and Peeters 1997), we observe that in Europe this has often deviated from
the positive effect that often assumed by the traditional Mundell-Flemming
literature.
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2.8 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a selected coverage of the mam
contributions to the literature of time-inconsistency. Several issues have
been stressed. Time-inconsistency within simple policy games arises
because policymakers face the temptation of increasing the level of
output by delivering a rate of inflation which is above the one expected
by the private sector. Although such policies may produce short-term
real effects, in the long run expectations will be revised upwards so as
to eliminate any monetary surprises. Therefore, such policies will
eventually result into an excessively high rate of inflation without any
output gain. Although there have been several attempts to solve this so
called inconsistency problem, the most successful recipe today still
remains the delegation of monetary policy to a central bank
characterised by high aversion to inflation. This is the now popular
argument of central bank independence. There is a second proposal
which has received a great deal of attention in the last few years. It is
the contractualist approach developed by Walsh according to which a
central bank may be inclined to lower inflation if it knows that a
penalty may be imposed upon it if it misses its target. The chapter also
focused on the several developments that have been made to account
for the important monetary and fiscal interactions which earlier works
had neglected. The problem with these more recent models, however,
is that they still remain rather complicated and difficult - sometimes
impossible - to solve analytically. Moreover, the assumptions
underlying their microfoundations are often somewhat arbitrary.
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Chapter 3
Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions in
Europe: A Case for Fiscal Policy Co-ordination
Contents: 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 General Model with Distortionary Taxes; 3.3 A Monetary Union
Game with Distortionary Income Tax; 3.4 Co-ordination Through a Walsh Mechanism; 3.5
Simulations; 3.6 Conclusion
3.1 Introduction
Now that EMU has become a reality, there is a considerable debate
on how fiscal policy should be managed in Europe. In the eyes of many
politicians, fully discretionary national fiscal policies may be needed to
counterbalance a strong and independent ECB. However, a significant
number of economists (Sibert (1992), Levine and Pearlman (1998),
Carlberg (1999) to name just a few) believe that the absence of
precommitment devices for decentralised fiscal policies will eventually
lead to excessive public expenditure - already very high in Europe, see
fig. 3.1 -, deficits and inflation, as each government engages in fiscal
expansions to increase domestic production, while passing some of the
costs of its fiscal activism to other countries in the form of higher
inflation and interest rates. The SGP has tried to guard against this by
imposing strict rules on the management of national budgetary policies
and imposing that each country's fiscal deficit should not exceed 3 per
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cent of GDP. It also forbids the ECB both from financing any member
country's deficit and bailing out a country in financial distress. Yet, as
we have seen, the SGP provisions do allow room for some flexibility.
If, on one hand, this is desirable because it makes monetary union
arrangements less vulnerable to the cycle disturbances, on the other
hand a too flexible and ad hoc interpretation of the current provisions
by national governments may raise an issue of credibility.
We have already emphasised how the structure upon which EMU
is built - decentralised fiscal policies versus centralised monetary policy
- is unprecedented and how it is far from clear if the fiscal anomaly
that currently characterises economic and monetary union in Europe is
indeed desirable. Our aim is to contribute to this discussion and
understand if theoretical support can be found in favour of fiscal
policy co-operation or other forms of co-ordination through
institutional mechanisms like the SGP.
Hence our question: is the current EMU set up desirable and what
IS the impact of either fiscal policy co-operation or fiscal
precommitment devices on inflation, public expenditure and the
optimal degree of independence of the ECB?
In this chapter we provide an argument in favour of co-ordination.
This is based on the fact that in an open economy governments
perceive that a unilateral fiscal expansion determines a real exchange
rate appreciation, which in a monetary union is entirely reflected into a
change of the relative prices. Hence there is an incentive to increase
public expenditure relative to foreign countries because higher domestic
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prices will reduce the real product wage and boost output. For the
other member countries, however, a foreign real exchange rate
appreciation is equivalent to a domestic depreciation, with opposite
effects on their output level. Therefore, as far as welfare is concerned,
fiscal policy in our model - as in van der Ploeg (1990) and Levine and
Pearlman (1998) - is beggar-thy-neighbour because it increases domestic
output at the expense of foreign countries' welfare.
We show that, when the fiscal authorities fail to internalise the
spillovers originating from their fiscal stances, both government
expenditures and tax distortions are excessively high. As a result,
output deviations from its natural level increase and the traditional
time-inconsistency problem of the monetary authorities worsens.
Our main result IS that co-ordination internalises these
inefficiencies, therefore reducing both the fiscal bias - temptation to
spend more than the socially optimal level - and its impact on the more
traditional inflation bias. This also reduces the optimal degree of
conservatism of the central bank. In fact, in so far as the fiscal
authorities engage in expansionary fiscal policies, the central bank will
have to pursue a tighter monetary policy in order to be able to deliver a
particular rate of inflation.
Still, how to achieve co-ordination is not an easy matter. In the
chapter we also suggest an alternative mechanism based on a principal-
agent micro-framework that can be used to obtain the same positive
results of fiscal policy co-ordination, but without an explicit
commitment to it.
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Our model is very close in spirit to van der Ploeg (1990 and 1993),
which provides a modern version of the Mundell-Flemming open-
economy model, and Levine and Pearlman (L&P, 1998), which
analyses the fiscal and monetary policy interactions between the "ins
and outs" to a monetary union. Here we develop a relatively more
simple model based on microfoundations. We endogenise fiscal policy
and concentrate on the case where the real exchange rate is the only
channel of policy transmission. Our main contribution in this chapter
is to introduce an explicit balanced budget rule for the fiscal authorities
and analyse the important distortionary effects of a tax levied on
people's income. Form this perspective our (first) model 1S a
development of that in L&P to include distortionary taxation.
We have allowed income taxes to play a crucial role in the
determination of wages because increased tax rates in the major
industrial economies have made both trade unions and workers more
conscious of the real value of their after-tax salaries". We have not
addressed, however, the issue of tax competition. Conversely, we have
emphasised the fact that, in their respective employment decisions, the
relevant price to the producer is the price of domestically produced
goods, while the relevant price to workers is the overall price level,
which is itself influenced directly by the real exchange rate. From this
point of view, our analysis is also close to Salop (1974).
21 VAT taxes, however, are considered in chapter four. The different choice of taxes
there derives from the need to have an open-economy model with fiscal policy which
remains as close as possible to the one devised by Beetsma and Bovemberg (1998,
B&B). Our aim is to show that the results derived in this chapter continue to hold in
the different B&B set up.
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The chapter proceeds as follows: section 3.2 develops a general
model of insiders and outsiders to a monetary union with distortionary
taxes and open-economy effects from fiscal policy. This model is to be
retained throughout the thesis. Section 3.3 considers the issues of time
inconsistency of monetary and fiscal policies within a monetary union
where public expenditure programs are financed with distortionary
income taxes. Section 3.4 presents a fiscal application of the Walsh
contracts, and section 3.5 goes one step further and computes the
optimal degree of ECB independence. Finally, section 3.6 summarises
and concludes.
3.2 General Model with Distortionary Taxes
Let us consider n+1 perfectly integrated economies with identical
economic structures and each specialising in the production of one
good. Goods are imperfect substitutes in consumption, while capital
stock is exogenously fixed. Countries run balanced budgets and are
able to finance their public expenditures only by raising distortionary
taxes", These are either levied on peoples' income or on firms' profits.
The demand side of the model closely follows Levine and
Pearlman (1998). We assume that in country i [i = O,... ,n] Cif units of
good j are imported from country j [j = O,... ,n].23 Given the total
consumption expenditure C, , consumers choose the units of
consumption {c}
lj j=O.n
to maximise an expected utility function
22 The introduction of seignorage and debt would not alter the substance of our
results.
23 All variables are dated at time t. A subscript ·1 indicates time t· 1.
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11
u, = Irij logCij + '7i log G,
j=o
1r ..=-
" n + 1
11
Irij = 1 (3.1)
;=0
subject to:
11
c, = I EijCij
j=o
(3.2)
E ij is the real exchange rate between country i and j and Y ij is the
share of good j in the consumption of the representative consumer of
country i. Government spending G, falls exclusively on domestic
goods. Equation (3.1) implies that the utility of individuals depends on
the levels of both government and private consumption, where the
latter is allocated equally between domestic and foreign goods.
Straightforward calculations show that the demand in country i is:
(3.3)
where the first two terms stand, respectively, for domestic and
foreign consumption and G, is public expenditure. We can express all
exchange rates relative to country zero and drop subscript 0 for
notational convenience. The demand equation for country 0 is
therefore:
69
y=_I_[C+ ~C.E'l+G
(n + 1) ~ 1 1 I1=1
(3.4)
We are now ready to move on to the supply side. Consider
country O.We assume that the representative firm maximises:
where L is labour and t v is a tax on firms' profits CVAT).
Production (y) is described by the Cobb-Douglas production function:
y = KfJ LI-fJ exp( - u) (3.6)
where u is a supply shock" and K is an exogenous capital stock.
Workers are represented by trade unions whose sole objective is to
achieve a target disposable real wage, the logarithm of which we
normalise to unity. Hence, unions' welfare function can be written as
(small letters denote logs):
(3.7)
where t W is a distortionary income tax". pC is the consumer price
index (CPI), defined as:
24Assumptions about the shocks are presented later on in the chapter.
25In (3.7) - t W is used as an approximation of In(1- t W) .
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(3.8)
ei the log of the real exchange rate of country i relative to country
o. Observe that equation (3.7) implies that wage setters only care about
a real post-tax wage target, while they regard any employment target as
unimportant",
The supply-side of the model is completed with an exogenous
partial indexing arrangement k E(O,l) linking the nominal wage to the
CPI so that:
(3.9)
The expreSSlOn for the real product wage is obtained by
differentiating (3.7) with respect to w and combining this result with
(3.9).This yields:
(3.10)
Conversely, the firm's maximisation problem requires:
(3.11)
26 Introduction of an employment target would complicate the algebra without
affecting the substance of the results.
71
Taking logs and approximating log( 1- t \,) with (- tv) (3.11)
becomes:
f(R.) - t" + P - (1- U = W (3.12)
where f( K) = log( 1- fJ) + fJlog K . The final equation for
employment (~ is derived by combining (3.9)-(3.11). This gives:
where I = faC) and
fJ
U
Ii=- .
b
The following assumptions are made about the supply shocks:
Iii -iid(O,er2);i=O,n
E(liilij) = per2 ;i,j = O,n,i::j:.j;_l.. ~ p~ 1
n
Equation (3.13) shows that employment depends upon the familiar
surprise price effect - which can only be eliminated with full
indexation (k=l) -, tax distortions and the supply shock. Employment
also depends upon the real exchange rate. This happens because a real
exchange rate appreciation contracts the real wage as shown by (3.10).
The closure of the model is given by the following standard results
for country 0:
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(3.14)
(3.15)
(3.14) is the Keynes-Ramsey Rule for consumption where R, is
the real interest rate over the interval [t, t+ 1] in country 0, Rit is
the real interest rate in country i and (J is the representative
consumer's rate of time preference. (3.15) is an UIP arbitrage
condition for the real exchange rate.
Let us now define sr = p" - P~l the CPI inflation of country 0
and 'ii = ;r - ;re the inflation surprise. Likewise we define
e; = ej - (ej ) e • The next step in the model is to express all variables
in deviation form about a baseline steady state, where policy
instruments are set at their optimal values. Lower case variables
will denote either a proportional change relative to the steady state
Y-Y . h _
(e.g. y = -_-, WIt Y the steady-state path), or an absolute
Y
change, such as inflation rates or g = G/Y - G/Y). The country 0
model linearised about a zero-inflation steady state is therefore
given by the following four equations:
(3.16)
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(C+1)" =c+rj(l+R) (3.18)
(e;.+lf =e. +(r-r;)j(l+R) (3.19)
(3.16) and (3.17) are the linearised equanons for demand and
supply", and (3.18) and (3.19) are the linearised forms of respectively
(3.14) and (3.15). To compute the rational expectations solution we
combine (3.18), its country i counterpart, and (3.19) to obtain:
(3.20)
We can now equate demand and supply in the domestic and
foreign country to get expressions of the expected and surprise
exchange rate effects. These are respectively:
where
27 The transformation: y = (1 - jJ)! - /3& has been applied to the supply side
equation.
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elfa = --==--:-=1-Glr
(3.22) shows that a domestic public expenditure surpnse
determines a surprise appreciation of the exchange rate, whereas the
opposite is true in the case of a domestic monetary surprise. The
combination of (3.17) and (3.21)-(3.22) gives our reduced form of
output for country 0:
(3.23)
where:
;r= (1-,8) (l-k)
jJ
[a + l/(n + 1)(1-,8)/ jJJ!V' = .;;_____;.-'------'----'-'--
[a + (1-,8)/ jJJ
f.L2 = (1- ,8)f.Ll
jJ(n + l)(a + (1-,8)/,8)
Hence, employment depends not only upon the traditional
inflation surprise but also upon a domestic public expenditure surprise
relative to other countries, because of the impact this has on relative
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pnces and on the real product wage. Additional elements affecting
output are the domestic level of (income and VAT) tax distortions and
the supply shocks both at home and abroad. The impact of the latter -
as well as of the public expenditure surprises - depends on the degree of
openness of the economy as captured by (1-!t'). Finally, (foreign)
monetary policy spillovers increase output via the appreciation of the
domestic real exchange rate.
It is important to observe that (3.23) implies a negative
transmission of fiscal policy. This is due to the fact that, for a given
level of public expenditure in the home country, an expenditure
increase in the rest of the union determines a real exchange rate
appreciation abroad. As we have seen in (3.10), this reduces the real
product wages and increases foreign production. For the home country,
however, a foreign appreciation is equivalent to a domestic real
depreciation, with opposite effects on its output level.
Observe that the underlying reason for a negative transmission of
fiscal policy in our modelling framework is the same as in van der
Ploeg (1990) and Levine and Pearlman (1998). Crucial to this result is
the assumption of imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign
goods and the fact that government consumption falls entirely on
domestic goods. The sign of the transmission would of course change if
we were to drop these assumptions and consider more traditional
models like Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962), or the modified
versions of McKibbin and Sachs (1991) and Krugman (1995). In these
models a domestic expansionary fiscal policy raises foreign GDP
whereas the opposite is true for an expansionary monetary policy.
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Similar results would also be obtained using frameworks where demand
increases output without affecting the price level (Obstfeld and Rogoff,
1995).
The empirical evidence in this regard (see Douven and Peeters,
1997) shows that in general the sign of both monetary and fiscal policy
spillovers crucially depends on the specific model assumptions and the
choice of parameters used in the calibrations. The most interesting
study remains the one of Whitley (1992). He compares the effects of
fiscal policy shocks originating in a number of European countries with
those of a fiscal policy shock originating in the US. Whitley reports
significant positive spillover effects of US shocks on the EU-economies,
but only very negligible effects both on the US and the other EU
countries of a fiscal expansion originating in a single European
economy. For European countries, in particular, the most interesting
result is that the relative magnitude and the sign itself of the spillovers
is subject to both the time horizon and the exchange rate considered.
Other relevant empirical studies are the ones of Helliwell and
Padmore (1985) and Frankel (1988). The first applies the same kind of
shock analyses on different multi-country models and compare the
responses of GDP in foreign countries to a fiscal and monetary shock
originating in a domestic country. Results suggest that a flexible
exchange rate increases the domestic income and pnce effects of
domestic monetary policy while reducing the foreign effects.
Conversely, the study by Frankel (1988) considers the specific case of a
permanent government expenditure shock of one per cent of GDP and
a permanent increase in the money stock of four per cent. He shows
that a fiscal expansion raises foreign GDP whereas the negative
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Mundell-Fleming effect of a domestic monetary expansion on foreign
GDP does not often materialise. However, these results are strongly
affected by the chosen set of parameters used.
We can now transform the n +1 country model for which no
particular regime has been specified into a model of ins and outs to a
monetary union (EMU). Let n+1 be the countries belonging to EMU
and m be the number of countries outside the monetary union. For
convenience and notational consistency all exchange rates remain all
relative to country o. The general function for output for country i is
given by:
(3.24)
n+m
where: X_; = LXj (Vi). Observe that for outsiders monetary
j=O;j .. i
spillovers are defined as:
n+m
'ii_; = (n + 1)'ii;+ L'iij
j=n+l;j .. i
(3.25)
Conversely, for insiders these amount to:
n+m
- - -0 - "'-1[_; = n1[; +mst = n1[; + L.J 1[j
j=n+l
(3.26)
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Hence, combining (3.26) with (3.24), the output function for the
generic country i belonging to EMU can be rewritten as:
(3.27)
n+m u/
where v( = > v·
n+m
This ends our general model of ins and outs with distortionary
taxation.
3.3 A Monetary Union Game with Distortionary
Income Tax
In the remainder of the chapter we consider only the fiscal and
monetary policy interactions occurring between the members of the
monetary union. We therefore set m =O. We also assume that tax
distortions are exclusively derived from income taxes (tV = 0). This
means that we can write output as:
(3.28)
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Moreover, existence of a balanced budget constramt for the
governments implies that:
(3.29)
The game involves n+2 players: ri+l Governments (Fiscal
Authorities, abbreviated with FA) and 1Central Bank (ECB). The loss
function in deviation form of the fiscal authorities is:
(3.30)
(3.30) implies that the government has a bliss point at the baseline
inflation and government spending/ GDP ratio", and a stochastically-
varying output target y - /3s relative to the socially sub-optimal natural
rate. The parameters bFA and CFA denote the weights of the output and
government spending objectives respectively, relative to the inflation
objective, which is normalised to unity.
Similarly, the loss function of the ECB is:
ECB n [ 2 (A)2 2 ]U = i~O "i + bECB Yi - Y + /3si + CECBgi (3.31)
In our modelling framework, monetary and fiscal policies are
discretionary and they both have a response advantage relative to wage
28 Observe that both individuals and the fiscal authorities care about public
expenditure. This is not assumed to be of the 'hole in the ground' variety (van der
Ploeg 1993)and yields direct utility as implied by equation (3.1).
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setters. Inflation and government spending are chosen in each period
after nominal wage contracts and expectations of inflation for that
period are formed, and current shocks have been observed.
The sequence of events is as follows:
1. Expectations of inflation and government spending are formed by wage
settersfor each country;
2. The supply shocks occur in each economy and are observed by both the
private sector and the policymakers. All can respond except wage setters;
3. The ECB and the FiscalAuthorities independently and simultaneously set
inflation and government spending in response to shocks.
The ECB minimises (3.31) with respect to average inflation, with
output given by (3.28); at the same time, fiscal policy is assumed to be
conducted purely in terms of government expenditure, i.e. the fiscal
authorities minimise (3.30) with respect to g.
Two scenarios are examined:
i) fiscal policies in EMU countries are not co-ordinated (FPNC);
ii) fiscal policies are co-ordinated (FPC).
i) First Scenario (FPNC)
The First Order Conditions when fiscal authorities do not co-
ordinate are:
n
I[lZ"; +bEcn4Y; + j}G; - Y)] = 0
;=0
(3.32)
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(3.33)
We now separate the first order conditions into deterministic
(expectational) (n=,g,ji) and stochastic components (Jr,g,y) and
develop the subsequent analysis concentrating on the former. Since we
are dealing with a model in deviation form, we can then identify any
positive deterministic components as a bias. Hence, calculating the
deterministic component of output from (3.28), we get that the
inflation and fiscal biases are respectively:
- b "AA -) b JA (1-,8)-]
ff = ECBA:\Y - Y = ECBA:lY + jJ g (3.34)
_ bFAPI (1- v/)Y
gFPNC = ~
CFA -':>
(3.35)
where q = bFA PI (1- V/) (1- /1)/ jJ.
(3.34) implies the existence of an important spillover effect of the
fiscal bias on the inflation bias. This derives from the fact that, when
the central bank anticipates that the fiscal authorities will relax their
fiscal stances, it will expect output to further deviate from its natural
rate. Hence, if it cares at all about output, it will be tempted to deliver a
higher rate of inflation. The public expenditure term contained in
(3.34) derives from the fact that, because government consumption is
tax financed, an expected increase in tax distortions is equivalent to the
expected level of government consumption.
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ii) Second Scenario (FPC)
When fiscal policies are co-ordinated, fiscal authorities are not
tempted to engineer expenditure surprises any longer because they
internalise the first order conditions of their counterparts. In other
words, they internalise the fact that demand-side policies aiming to
increase output through changes in the relative prices will sort no
desired effect. This means that, while the first order condition for the
monetary authority remains unchanged, the one of the fiscal authorities
becomes:
(3.36)
It is straightforward to show that co-ordination yields:
(3.37)
Hence, fiscal policy co-ordination eliminates the time
inconsistency problem of the fiscal authorities. At the same time,
because the ECB expects that (distortionary) tax-financed government
expenditures will no longer deviate from their optimal steady state
values, it has a reduced incentive to stimulate output via monetary
surpnses. This means that co-ordination also mitigates the time
inconsistency problem affecting monetary policy. It is important to
observe that monetary time inconsistencies will fully disappear only if
the central bank is able to precommit to an optimal path for inflation.
Alternatively, when a full indexing (k = 1) arrangement eliminates any
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stabilising role for monetary policy. In fact, when if k = 1 => X = 0
and the monetary surprise has no effect on output (seeequation 3.28).
[Figure 3.2 here]
Fig. 3.2 b summarises the above results. Any shifting in the upper
right of the graph represents a worsening of what we may call the
economy's structural inefficiency because both the inflation and the
spending bias increase. The ideal point to be for a country is 0, where
both biases are absent. However, the perceived existence of a
stabilisation role for both fiscal and monetary policies moves the
equilibrium in the upper right of the graph (point B). The main result
of the chapter is that, when we endogenise tax distortions, the inflation
bias becomes a function of the spending bias. Graphically, the line of
the inflation bias is no longer horizontal as implied in Levine and
Pearlman (1998) (fig. 3.2c-3.2d), but it has a positive slope equal to
bECB x(1 - jJ) / jJ. Therefore, the higher the spending bias, the higher the
inflation bias will be. As shown in (3.34), such spillover effects arise in
the model via the deterministic component of output, which is itself
proportional to the spending bias. Observe that, if we were to simplify
the model and describe the simple case where trade unions only have a
real wage target, the deterministic component of output in equilibrium
would be zero. The inflation bias would then be independent of the
public expenditure bias, and the former would simplify to:
(3.38)
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This is the same result obtained by Rogoff (1985a). When fiscal
policy spillovers are not accounted for, what matters is only the central
bank's aversion to inflation captured by the term bECB (high inflation
aversion implies small bECB) •
It is interesting to observe that, if taxes were to be lump-sum, the
spending bias would turn out to be:
(3.39)
It follows that, in the case of fiscal policy non co-ordination,
distortionary taxation increases the spending bias : the bigger q, the
higher the bias. This happens because taxes create distortions which
have a negative impact on the level of output. Fiscal authorities, when
these operate non co-operatively, will be tempted to increase public
spending in order to achieve their output target: of course, in a
balanced-budget framework, this will increase distortions even more
and start a vicious circle.
3.4 Co-ordination Through a Walsh Mechanism
In this section we sketch a possible institutional arrangement that
could be substitute for fiscal policy co-ordination. The idea comes from
Walsh (1995). He attempts to solve the time inconsistency problem of
monetary policy by proposing a contract between the central bank and
the government based on a principal-agent framework. Such a contract
should be such that the outcome of the central bank's maximisation
problem results in the socially optimal monetary rule.
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Our case here is rather different because agents are not central
banks but national governments. Moreover, the current EMU structure
does not provide a clear view of who should control national
governments (Ecofin, the Councilor an ad hoc body?). However, as far
as our 'theoretical' exercise is concerned, we can work on the
assumption that a principal exists imposing a fine on the fiscal
authorities spending more than the agreed optimal public expenditure
level. In other words, what we require is that, when minimising its loss
function, each fiscal authority internalises the disutility arising from its
excessively relaxed domestic fiscal stance.
The treatment follows al Nowaihi and Levine (1996a). Suppose
that the sovereign fiscal authorities have a loss function L = .9U + pg ,
where .9U is the money value of the utility function and p is a linear
penalty in public expenditure.". The factor .9 is required to convert
the social loss into monetary units so that it can be added to the
monetary cost given by the public expenditure penalty term. In fact,
the term U can only be represented as an ordinal utility,
whereas pg represents a cardinal utility. The fiscal authorities' new loss
function therefore becomes:
FA. (FA 2 A 2 2) ()L l =.9 U. + p.g. = It. +bF,,, (y. - y + Jk.) + cF,,,g. + p.g. 3.40l II l .til l Ar i ll.
29 Here we are talking about penalties on public expenditure. these are conceptually
different from the SGP,. which imposes a penalty on excessive deficits. However,
since it has generally occurred in the past that debt was issued to finance government
expenditures, we can consider the two penalties as substantially equivalent. For
simplicity, in this thesis we shall sometimes refer to the penalty here derived as a SGP
penalty.
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Assuming that .9 = 1for simplicity, it is straightforward to show
that the optimal punishment required to eliminate the fiscal bias within
this context is :
(3.41)
Proof SeeAppendix 3A
As (3.41) shows, the punishment is directly linked, by a factor A,
to both the employment target and its weight. Provided the penalty is
credibly (and we should add technically) implementable, this
punishment - which of course remains still subject to the McCallum's
critique - would lead to tighter fiscal stances throughout the monetary
union. We would then be able obtain the same positive results of fiscal
policy co-ordination, but without an explicit commitment to it.
3.5 Simulations
So far the degree of central bank independence has been considered
as exogenously fixed. What happens if this assumption changes?
Unfortunately, the model in this case becomes too complicated for an
analytical solution to be worked out. Therefore, we need to refer to
simulation techniques. The aim of our simulation exercise is to find the
optimal degree of independence of the ECB (CBI) - computed as the
ratio bFA /bECB - and to see how such a degree depends on the
correlation of the supply shocks.
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We start by combining (3.28) with the first order conditions for
inflation and public expenditure under scenarios ~ and ii}. This gives
the two loss functions of the fiscal authorities to be minimised with
respect to bECB. These are:
where
1
Z = (1-,8)
a + --'--__.:_...;...
jJ
in the case of fiscal policy non co-ordination, and:
(3.43)
when fiscal authorities act co-operatively.
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The calibrations used are as follows" (see appendix 3B for the
simulation program):
n=10
CFA (cweight) = 5
jJ (beta) = 0.3
Unemployment (lhat) = 5%
Inflation (pbar) = 5%
Variance of the Supply shocks (sigmau) = 3%
elf (c) = 0.6
atv (gr) = 0.2
k=0.5
bFA (bm) = chosen to calibrate an annual inflation of 5%
The number of EMU members (n+1) has been set equal to 11,
which corresponds to the number of countries who are going to adopt
the single currency by the year 2002. Observe, however, that our
model assumes identical economies and therefore it would consider two
countries like Germany and Luxembourg, for example, as carrying
exactly the same weight. For the rest of the calibrations, these remain
in line with the chosen set in Levine and Pearlman (1998), with the
difference that here trade unions have a wage target rather than an
employment target. For what concerns the indexing arrangement (k),
an average number has been imposed given the reduced relevance of
seignorage for many European economies. Alteration of this particular
)0 Letters in parenthesis stand for the equivalent symbols used in the simulation
programs.
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assumption does not change, however, the qualitative nature of the
results.
Results are summarised in figures 3.3 - 3.5. First, the optimal level
of central bank independence is negatively related to the degree of
correlation of the supply shocks. The closer the correlation coefficient
to one (i.e. the more symmetric the shocks become), the lower the
optimal level of central bank independence. The reason for this
downward slope is that, when shocks are symmetric, relative prices do
not adjust automatically. Hence, the central bank should put more
weight on output stabilisation and less on the goal of reducing the
inflationary bias. {this follows from equation (3.22)31).
A second result we obtain is that the optimal degree of central
bank independence remains unaffected by the decision to co-ordinate
fiscal policies in a model without distortionary taxation. This derives
from the fact that, because tax distortions are absent, the central bank
does not account for the fact that under fiscal policy non co-ordination
(FPNC) the output level contracts below the zero steady state level.
Conversely, when the output effect of tax distortions is correctly
endogenised, co-ordination reduces the optimal degree of independence
of the ECB because it removes the fiscal spillover effects on the
inflation bias. Moreover since under FPC fiscal distortions disappear
and monetary time inconsistencies are mitigated, welfare is increased. It
is important to observe that, without fiscal policy co-ordination, the
welfare loss of the fiscal authorities is always higher for all correlation
coefficients in the case with distortionary taxes. This is due to the fact
31 The same result is obtained in Levine and Pearlman (1998).
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that lack of internalisation of the output effects of individual countries'
public expenditure policies induces governments to loosen their fiscal
stance and therefore increase tax distortions even more.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we argue in favour of fiscal policy co-ordination in a
monetary union. We show that, when the fiscal authorities internalise
the important spillover effects originating from their excessively
expansionary fiscal policies, they reduce the structural inefficiencies -
inflation and spending biases - that are likely to characterise their
economies. Such a positive result can be obtained either with the
explicit co-ordination of fiscal policies or with the introduction of a
credible penalty in public expenditure - of the kind implied by the
stability pact - in the utility function of each fiscal authority. From this
point of view, the SGP represents a surrogate for discipline, that is a
substitute for fiscal policy co-ordination that is able to back up the
empty shell of central bank independence. We also show that, when
fiscal authorities act co-operatively, the optimal degree of conservatism
of the central bank declines. This happens because, to the extent that
national governments engage in expansionary and inflationary fiscal
policies, the monetary authorities will have to pursue a tighter
monetary policy in order to get closer to their bliss point for inflation.
So, is co-ordination bringing about gain without pain? The answer
our simple model seems to suggest is yes. However, it is now time to
check if our positive results are still preserved under a different - and
perhaps closer to reality - game theoretical structure. This is indeed
what we are going to do in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
On the Desirability of Fiscal
Policy Co-ordination when the Fiscal
Authorities act as Stackelberg Leaders
Contents: 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 A Simple Model with Stackelberg Leadership; 4.3 An Extended
Model with Open-Economy Effects from Fiscal Policy; 4.4 Results; 4.5 Conclusion
4.1 Introduction
The main conclusion of chapter three is that existence of open-
economy (relative price) effects from fiscal policy in a monetary union
provides a case in favour of fiscal policy co-ordination. In fact, co-
ordination helps to contain excessive public expenditure within levels
which are compatible with the provisions of the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP), thereby reducing the negative effects of distortionary
taxation on output. As a result, the fiscal spillover effects on the
inflationary bias disappear and the monetary authorities are able to
respond with increased flexibility to the cycle disturbances.
Although the above results are substantially in line with those of
the mainstream literature favouring co-ordination (Sibert (1992), Levine
and Pearlman (1998), Aizenman (1992) and (1993)), we now want to
extend our analysis in one important direction. So far we have assumed
that the monetary and fiscal authorities move simultaneously, taking
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the other player's move as given, i.e. we have considered a Nash game.
Although such a simple game theoretical structure does provide us with
several interesting results, it fails to account for the fact that the two
policymakers may operate rather differently in the real world. In fact,
while the monetary authorities are able to adjust their policy relatively
quickly, fiscal authorities are likely to be much more constrained in
this respect. Approval of the annual budget by Parliament is normally a
very long process and, when this is finally reached, it is virtually
impossible for the fiscal authorities to deliver policies aiming at
stabilising output when unexpected disturbances occur - unless
automatic stabilisers have been set up. Hence, when considering fiscal
and monetary policy interactions, it may be important to account for
the fact that tax rates cannot be adjusted as quickly as monetary policy.
In a game theoretic perspective, this means that a perhaps more
appropriate way of analysing this sort of macroeconomic policy
interactions is to set up a game where fiscal authorities behave as
Stackelberg leaders vis-a-vis the central bank, in the sense that a
particular choice of tax rates provides the government with a first-
mover advantage.
To our best knowledge, there has been only one tentative analysis
conducted in this direction and which is relevant to our study. Beetsma
and Bovenberg (1998, B&B) developed a model where distortionary
taxes and seignorage revenues are used to finance public expenditures
(as in Alesina and Tabellini, 1987), but with the fiscal authorities
behaving as leaders cl la Stackelberg. In this case each government acts
strategically, perceiving that the output distortions caused by a tax
increase will be partly offset by an inflation surprise. However, rational
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wage setters antlclpate this, with the advantage of the fiscal
policymaker resulting once again in an inflation bias. It follows that
fiscal policy co-ordination, which apparently strengthens the position
of the leader, turns out to be counterproductive.
The results obtained by Beetsma and Bovenberg are strikingly in
contrast with the ones we derived in chapter three, and would seem to
credit the view that the current European Union approach to fiscal
policy is indeed the correct one. Hence the question: are these two
positions regarding the optimality of fiscal policy co-operation
mutually compatible?
The aim of this chapter is, first, to improve upon our previous
analysis with a closer-to-reality game theoretical structure where
policymakers act sequentially. We therefore want to understand how
the results set out in chapter three are affected under this modified
scenario. Second, we aim to show that Beetsma and Bovenberg's
argument for applying the Subsidiarity principle to fiscal policymaking
within a monetary union may not necessarily be in contrast with the
mainstream literature favouring fiscal policy co-ordination. The point
we shall make is that B&B neglect the possibility that, in a monetary
union, national fiscal authorities might have an incentive to boost
domestic output through the kind of traditional demand-side policies
we examined in chapter three. The endogenisation of such policies may
in fact move the balance in favour of co-ordination when governments'
temptation to alter the real exchange rate for stabilisation purposes is
sufficiently strong.
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On the other hand, the objective function of the ECB is given by":
(4.4)
Such a function depends on inflation and a weighted average of
output in each country. The reason why the central bank's objective
function includes a term referring to output stabilisation is that,
although the ECB has a mandate to price stability, one could well
imagine that in practice national governments will find ways to
pressure for a more relaxed monetary stance when employment is low.
However, we shall maintain the realistic assumption that the bank is
weight-conservative (amn > «, )36.
The sequence of events follows Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998):
1. member states delegate monetary policy to the ECB, which has an
exogenously fixed degree of independence;
2. nominal wage contracts are signed;
3. thefiscal authorities set taxes and public expenditure;
4. the ECB sets inflation".
35 Adding expenditure deviations from targets to equation (4.4) would not
significantly alter our results.
36 Alternatively, we might have assumed that amn = at(, but with a target-
conservative central bank as in Svensson (1997).
37 Another sequence - not examined in this thesis - might be :1,3,2,4. This would
imply that fiscal policy cannot be changed during the wage contract.
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We start solving the game by backward induction. Recalling the
definition of output given in (4.1), the central bank reaction function is
. b ;VEeB 1
grven y 1&=0
This yields:
Jl"= 1 {Jl"e + -( 1 )I(tn}
1+ a sm n + 1 ;=0
(4.5)
Hence, higher expected inflation and high tax distortions in any of
the participating countries induce the central bank to raise inflation in
order to protect employment. Note, however, that the relative weight
that the union central bank attaches to employment in country i is only
Iln-th of the weight that a national central bank would attach to
employment if monetary policy would be determined at the national
rather than the union level.
Turning now to fiscal policy, in each country the fiscal authority
sets the tax rate so as to balance the marginal benefits of a tax financed
increase in expenditure with the costs of higher taxes. In addition, the
assumption that fiscal authorities act as Stackelberg leaders ois-s-ois the
central bank implies the anticipation of the monetary responses to their
own decisions (4.5). The first order condition for each fiscal authority is
then obtained deriving (4.3) with respect to tt. This gives:
(4.6)
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We now observe that:
a; = -1+ dJr
a d:I I
(4.7)
This means that fiscal authorities realise that output distortions
caused by a tax financed expenditure have a negative impact on output.
This is captured by the first term on the R.H.S. of (4.7). Yet, the
strategic nature of the game implies that fiscal authorities anticipate that
such an impact will be partly offset by a monetary surprise. This is
captured by the second term on the R.H.S. of the same equation. The
anticipation regarding the monetary response will in turn depend on
the way fiscal policies are being managed throughout the union. We
start with the first scenario of fiscal policy non co-operation. This
yields:
(4.8)
(4.8) states quite clearly that the response of the ECB is perceived
to be inversely related to its inflation aversion (as captured by the first
factor), and at the same time proportional to the increased average level
of tax distortions caused by a unilaterally relaxed domestic fiscal stance
(second factor in 4.8). Therefore, combining equations (4.1), (4.2), (4.5)-
(4.8), and noting that in equilibrium 1[= 1[e; tt = ti (Vi,j), we get that
the level of distortionary taxation when fiscal authorities act non co-
operatively is:
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(4.9)
Let us now move on to the second scenario. When fiscal policies
are managed co-operatively governments' bargaining position vis-a-vis
the central bank strengthens because each fiscal authority correctly
anticipates the global effect of a domestic tax increase on inflation. This
induces a more aggressive use of the tax instrument. Hence in this case
we shall have that:
(4.10)
Therefore, combining (4.1), (4.2), (4.5), (4.6) and (4.10) we obtain
the equilibrium solution for the domestic tax rates when fiscal policies
are non co-ordinated:
t.v,FPC = agsg(1 + amn)
I (:: -1)+(1+amn)(1+ags)
(4.11)
We now want to formalise the implications of fiscal policy co-
operation on the level of tax distortions. We therefore subtract (4.11) to
(4.9) and concentrate only on the parameters that determine the sign of
the tax difference. We get:
t ~,FPNC _ t ~,FPC = _n_ ( a:rf - 1)
I I (n+l) amn
(4.12)
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Some comments are in order. When the central bank IS not
independent and shares the same preferences about inflation of the
national fiscal authorities (a sm = a:if ) , t ~.FPNC _ t ~.FPC = 0I I so that
incentives for a strategic use of the tax instrument are invariant to the
fiscal policy scenario. This result is quite intuitive. Absence of conflict
between fiscal authorities and the central bank about the inflation
objectives means that fiscal authorities will not need to exert extra
pressure on the ECB to loosen its monetary stance. This in a way
removes governments' commitment problem. However, our
maintained assumption that the central bank assigns a larger weight on
inflation stabilisation than the government does implies that fiscal
authorities raise taxes in order to encourage the ECB to deliver a higher
rate of inflation, thereby bringing the equilibrium outcome more in
line with governments' preferences. It follows that, because co-
ordination strengthens the bargaining position of the fiscal authorities
uis-a-uis the central bank, the strategic use of the tax instrument
produces higher distortions (and inflation) when policies are managed
co-operatively" _
Summing up, this simple model has shown that fiscal co-ordination
changes the strategic interactions between policymakers. With lack of
co-ordination, the effect of unilateral changes in the tax instrument on
the common monetary policy is relatively small. This discourages
governments from making a strategic use of the tax instrument cis-a-ins
38 Observe that the fiscal commitment problem worsens with the introduction of
seignorage because this increases the governments' benefits of inflation. It also
worsens and when the union gets larger. In fact, as n increases, the bargaining
position of the fiscal authorities vis-a-vis the central bank increases as well.
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the ECB. Conversely, with fiscal policy co-ordination fiscal players
internalise the effects of unilateral changes in taxation of the other
fiscal players. This encourages each fiscal authority to use its tax
instrument more heavily so as to induce a change in the monetary
stance in the direction preferred. This is exactly the result obtained by
Beetsma & Bovenberg (1998).
4.3 An Extended Model with Open-Economy Effects
from Fiscal Policy
We now extend our simple model to account for the existence of
open- economy (relative price) effects from fiscal policy of the type
described in chapter three.
Consider once agam a monetary union conslstmg of n+1
symmetric countries, each producing a differentiated good. Output in
each country is defined as follows:
(4.13)
where
Xi = PI (1- P)Yi
- PPI (1- V)c = ~~--:--_;_
(1- p)n
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(4.13) is derived from (3.28) assuming absence of both indexing
arrangements (k = 0) and supply shocks, and that t;W = o. We re-
introduce t;V as in (3.24). For convenience both members have been
multiplied by (fJ/1- fJ). As in chapter three Ji = ff - s" is the inflation
surpnse of the union wide consumer pnce index and
[g; - .I.(:)1is a relative public expenditure surprise.
)=0;1'.'
As before, we assume that governments run balanced budgets
is, = tn and that the loss functions are given by (4.3) and (4.4). The
sequence of events is the same as in section (4.2).
4.4 Results
Let us concentrate exclusively on systematic policies and start
solving the game by backward induction". Recalling the new definition
of Xi given in (4.13), the central bank reaction function is:
ff= 1 {ffe+_l-Iun}
1+ a"", (n + 1) ;=0
(4.14)
Hence, the central bank's reaction function is identical to the one
derived in the previous section. We maintain our assumption that the
bank is weight-conservative (a"", > an[).
39 We neglect policy responses to shocks, i.e. the way fiscal policy responds to
symmetric and perfectly asymmetric shocks. An analysis of this issue is however
provided by Catenaro and Tirelli (1999).
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Each fiscal authority sets the tax rate so as to balance the marginal
benefits of a tax financed increase in expenditure with the costs of
higher taxes:
(4.15)
Let us now concentrate on how the introduction of open-economy
policies affects the perceived costs and benefits of fiscal actions. To
begin with, let us assume that the tax rate in each country is set non co-
operatively, so that the governments fail to internalise the responses of
the other fiscal authorities. Combining equations (4.13) and (4.2) we
get:
ai [1 -] O;r (1 -) 1-=- -c +-=- -c +...,..-----,---ai d, (1+ anm)(n + 1)
(4.16)
First of all, each fiscal authority realises that output distortions
caused by a tax financed increase in expenditures will be partly offset
by the impact of expenditures on output (c). On the other hand, the
fiscal authorities correctly anticipate that public spending policies have
no effect on inflation, since in aggregate these are equal to zero.
Furthermore, they foresee that the ECB will increase inflation
following a rise in taxes. As in the previous model, we assume that the
fiscal authorities do not internalise the adverse effect of taxation on
expectations. Hence, they perceive that the inflation response to
t,partly offsets output distortions. Due to the sequential nature of the
game, fiscal policy is subject to time inconsistency. However, the FA
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does not internalise the fact that the tax increase is implemented
throughout the union. As a result, the impact of higher domestic taxes
on inflation is underestimated. This, in turn, mingates the
consequences of time inconsistency.
Combining equations (4.2), (4.13) - (4.16), and notmg that in
equilibrium 1[ = 1[e; t;V = t;, vi, we get that the level of distortionary
taxation when fiscal authorities act non co-operatively is:
(4.17)
Comparing (4.17) with (4.9), it is worth observing that the
introduction of open-economy effects from fiscal policy (c > 0)
increases tax distortions. This is due to the fact that a tax financed
increase in public expenditures is perceived to stimulate output via a
domestic real exchange rate appreciation.
Let us move on to the second scenario of fiscal policy co-
ordination. In this case each fiscal authority realises that, since
governments are subject to identical incentives, any attempt to
stimulate output via an increase in domestic expenditures is bound to
fail. On the other hand co-ordination exacerbates the time
inconsistency problem, because - as in the simple model presented in
section two - each FA correctly anticipates the global effect of a
domestic tax increase on inflation. Hence in this case we shall have that:
105
d. 0Jr 1
-' =-I+-=-I+...,------c-
d" a: (1+a ), , mm
(4.18)
Therefore, combining (4.2), (4.13), (4.14), (4.15) and (4.18) we
obtain the equilibrium solution for the tax rate:
t~,FPC = agsg(1 + amm)
, (:: -1) +(I+amn)(I+ags)
(4.19)
As expected, this result is identical to (4.11). This is due to the fact
that the extra incentives to stimulate output via demand side or public
expenditure policies disappear when fiscal policies are co-ordinated.
It is important to observe that, if each fiscal authority could
precommit to a policy rule which internalises both the effects of tax
policy actions on inflation expectations and on the welfare loss of the
other fiscal authorities, the second best'? would obtain:
(4.20)
On the other hand, absence of co-ordination would give:
40 The first best would require non distortionary taxes. Subscript p stands for
precommitment solution.
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n+l allnl
(4.21)
Comparing (4.20) and (4.21) with (4.17) and (4.19) it is clear that
under the precommitment solution the level of distortionary tax would
be lower than in a regime of discretion. It would be straightforward to
show that, under this new scenario, fiscal policy co-ordination is
welfare-increasing and therefore always desirable.
We now have all the information we need to evaluate the
desirability of fiscal policy co-ordination within our extended
modelling framework. Subtracting (4.19) from (4.17) we get:
with:
When c = 0 the results coincide with those established in section 2.
However, when c:;t: 0 a trade-off is established. This is due to the fact
that the choice to co-ordinate fiscal policies produces two effects. On
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one hand it enhances the bargaining power of the fiscal authorities
creating the premises for a more aggressive use of the tax instrument.
This in turn raises inflation. On the other hand, co-ordination implies
that fiscal authorities internalise the effects of open-economy policies
on output as well as the externalities originating from their excessively
loose fiscal stances. We can therefore conclude that when the perceived
output effects of an expenditure surprise are sufficiently strong, fiscal
policy co-ordination remains desirable as in the case of simultaneous
policy decisions described in the previous chapter. See appendix 4A for
an extended version of the model accounting for seignorage.
4.6 Conclusion
Our conclusions run counter to the view recently expressed by
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) that decentralisation of fiscal policies is
necessarily conducive to both monetary and fiscal discipline. However,
our results remain somewhat more ambiguous than the ones derived in
chapter three. In fact, on one hand fiscal policy co-ordination
strengthens the bargaining position of the fiscal authorities vis-a-vis the
central bank. This first effect is not desirable because it carries adverse
effects on expectations. On the other hand, co-ordination internalises
the effects of individual countries' public expenditure policies on
output. This second effect is, instead, desirable because it reduces
incentives to loosen the fiscal stance. Hence, desirability of fiscal policy
co-ordination in a monetary union crucially depends upon which of the
two effects ultimately prevails.
108
Chapter 5
EMU and Labour Market Reform
Contents: 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 The Model; 5.3 Reforms under EMU, 5.4 Reforms outside EMU; 5.5
Results; 5.6 Conclusion
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we have analysed the important monetary
and fiscal policy interactions arising in a monetary union. Our findings
suggest that fiscal policy co-ordination achieves second best results
within a Nash framework, where policymakers operate independently
and simultaneously. However, when the choice of the tax instrument
provides governments with a first-mover advantage vis-a-vis the central
bank, the desirability of fiscal policy co-ordination remains subject to
the existence of a stabilisation role for public expenditure policies. This
means that, for sufficiently strong open-economy effects from fiscal
policy, co-ordination always remains beneficial.
Yet, the institutional arrangements discussed in this thesis do not
solve the policymakers' commitment problems. In fact, if on one hand
co-ordination helps governments realise that unilateral public
expenditure surprises do not sort any real output effects, on the other
hand penalties on public expenditures modify governments' welfare
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functions without affecting their relative preferences. In other words,
the institutional arrangements we have so far analysed, far from
providing recipes on how to increase an unsatisfactory low output
level, simply reduce governments' temptation to use self-defeating
policies.
It is widely believed, however, that reforms almmg to mitigate
labour market rigidities would be by far more effective than any
artificial constraint imposed upon policymakers. In fact, equilibrium
unemployment is mainly determined by the institutions in the labour
market, and can only be significantly reduced by well designed labour
market reforms". These could involve, for example, a reduction in the
level and duration of unemployment benefits and a progressive
substitution of these with employment vouchers. More generally, as
suggested by Calmfors (1998a), reforms should involve a less stringent
employment-protection legislation aimed at reducing firing costs, and a
larger scope for individual and more flexible wage contracts.
It is difficult to ignore, however, that such potentially beneficial
measures may be rather difficult to implement in the real world. In
fact, the ruling coalition might raise ideological objections. They could
also be blocked by both the workers, who could perceive them as
reducing the welfare of the employed majority, and by those
unemployed worried about losing their privileges (Saint-Paul (1993),
Orzag and Snower (1999)).
41 See the excellent survey studies published in the special issue on EMU of the
Oxford Review of Economic Policy (1998,vol. 14 no.3).
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This chapter addresses the issue of labour market reforms in a
context where both policymakers are subject to time inconsistencies.
Specifically, it focuses on the political economy question of how
incentives to reform are likely to be affected under the unique policy
regime provided by the EMU. The analytical framework we use is the
one of a single-period game where labour market reforms (observe that,
unlike in Orzag and Snower (1999), these do not include tax reforms)
are unilaterally and simultaneously decided at the beginning of the
game by all the national fiscal authorities. Moreover, we assume that
domestic reforms have no spillovers on foreign countries. Note that,
although this IS a rather ad hoc construction, it would be
straightforward to show that the assumption of positive spillovers
would strengthen the results presented in section 5.542•
Finally, we assume to be able to express the positive output effects
of reforms with a single composite variable s, normalised to assume only
positive values (alternatively, we should have used a series of variables
{s P S2 , .•. , Sn}, each standing for the output effects of a particular
policy).
Existing literature has conducted an interesting analysis of the
impact that different policy regimes have on the incentives to
implement structural reforms. The possibility that macroeconomic
policy might affect the implementation of reforms was first suggested
by Gordon (1996), and was subsequently addressed by Sibert (1996)
using a simple framework characterised by absence of time
inconsistencies. More recently, a comprehensive analysis of the political
incentives to conduct structural reforms was undertaken by Calmfors
42 Also the traditional literature in this regard ignores spillover effects.
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(1998a,b). His argument is that there is more reform outside a
monetary union to the extent that the national inflation bias can be
reduced. This happens when the fiscal authorities internalise the effects
of their unilateral increase in labour market reform on the level of tax
distortions affecting the economy and therefore inflation. However, he
finds that the existence of a precautionary motive for low average
unemployment might reverse this result, when membership of a
monetary union ensures more effectively against the cyclical
fluctuations of output. Less ambiguous conclusions are reached by
Sibert and Sutherland (1997), who argue that monetary union lowers
the incentives to reform because it internalises the negative monetary
spillovers associated with the independent conduct of monetary
policy", Among other related works is the contribution by Ozkan et
al. (1997), studying the extent to which the inflation entry condition
contained in the Maastricht Treaty encourages structural reforms by
potential EMU entrants.
Overall, these studies generally find that monetary union reduces
the incentives to reform. Hence, the (often implicit) conclusion that, if
governments were to base their decision to join a monetary union
predominantly on the impact that this has on their incentives to
reform, they would most probably choose to stay outside.
We are rather uncomfortable with the policy-implications of this
literature. The reason is that we believe such implications do not apply
to the case of the EMU. In fact, if it is clearly obvious that the decision
43 Observe that an obvious limit of this study is that the particular sign of the
spillovers is not derived from microfoundations as in this thesis, but simply assumed
to be such.
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to join a monetary union has potentially severe output costs, why were
so many countries - particularly those with unsound fiscal policies -
willing to join the European Monetary Union? There is obviously
something that the literature is not able to account for.
We argue that the counterfactual policy implications of the
mainstream literature - at least for the case of EMU - derive from the
fact that none of the existing works has linked monetary union and the
issue of reforms to the existence of some kind of penalty imposed upon
either excessive government spending or debt (i.e. a SGP or surrogate).
Moreover, the literature on reforms has systematically failed to
consider open-economy effects of the type this thesis examines.
The model we set up in section 5.2 formalises both labour market
and tax distortions in a framework where fiscal policy is endogenously
treated and subject to an explicit balanced budget rule. Our aim is to
analyse how incentives to reform are affected in a monetary union
characterised by restricted fiscal discretionary power (EMU) as
compared to countries preserving their autonomy in the management
of both fiscal and monetary policies (outsiders). Crucial to our analysis
is the assumption that, while all countries gain from an increased
amount of labour market reforms, tax distortions uniquely affect the
outsiders' economies. We motivate this assumption with the fact that
participation to EMU is conditional on the acceptance of the SGp44 (see
appendix 1C). Such a condition de facto implies the precommitment of
44 Ozkan et at. (1997) assumes that monetary union faces no tax distortions. However,
they do not motivate this assumption with the existence of the SGP and exclude from
their analysis the possibility that labour market distortions might affect output.
113
the fiscal authorities, who have no choice other than avoiding
deviations of distortionary taxes from their steady state values.
The outline of the chapter is as follows: section 5.2 introduces the
model and develops the game. Section 5.3 presents the results for both
EMU countries and outsiders, and section 5.4 provides some
concluding thoughts.
5.2 The Model
Let us consider an economy consisting of n+1countries belonging
to a monetary union (EMU) and m outsiders. Inside EMU fiscal
policies are managed by decentralised non co-operative fiscal authorities
whereas monetary policy is conducted at a federal level by the union
central bank (ECB). Conversely, outsiders maintain their autonomy in
the management of both monetary and fiscal policies, which, as in the
case of EMU, are assumed to be conducted in a discretionary way.
Moreover, we assume that output of both outsiders and insiders
increases with reform, although this carries a political cost. Finally, all
national governments are subject to the balanced budget rule:
(i=O,n) (5.1)
This means that distortionary income taxation IS the only
instrument available to finance public consumption.
Let us now move on to the definition of the loss functions. We
assume these to be standard quadratic Barro-Gordon, but with one
important innovation. This is the introduction of a single composite
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variable s (normalised so that s ~ 0) standing for the cost arising from
the adoption of labour market reforms. This means that, alongside the
traditional inflation, public expenditure and output deviation
components, the policymakers' welfare functions are also affected by
the amount of labour market reforms government are able (or willing)
to deliver while in office.
Hence, the loss function of the EBC can be written as:
n
ECB ~ (2 b ( A) 2 2 2 )U/ = ~ Jr; + ECB y; - Y + CECBg; + Y ECBS;
;=0
(5.2)
where x.y.g and S stand respectively for inflation, output, public
expenditure and labour market reforms. y is a deterministic output
target. Note that g and yare expressed in deviation form about the
bliss level of government expenditure and the natural rate of output
before reform respectively. Observe also that reforms are taken as given
by the monetary authorities.
Conversely, for the outs each central bank is run by bankers with
different preferences reflected in their single-period loss function:
CB 2 b ( A)2 2 2U·o = Jr. + CB y; - Y + CCBg; + YCBS;I. 1 (5.3)
Moving on to the outsiders' fiscal authorities, their objective function
is given by:
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(5.4)
The interpretation is the same as for (5.3), with the difference that
governments assign a larger weight to the output target (bFA > beB), and
that s is no longer exogenously given. Reforms are in fact decided by
the fiscal authorities at the end of their optimisation process.
EMU fiscal authorities have a similar loss function. However, their
discretionary power when it comes to a particular choice for taxes is
limited by an endogenously determined linear penalty in public
expenditure. Its aim is to reduce tax distortions to an optimal steady
state value". This means that governments belonging to the monetary
union internalise the fact that expenditure in excess of a given socially
optimal level will be punished by a (credible) institutional arrangement
at the union level. Such an arrangement can be assumed to be identical
to the one described in section 3.4 of this thesis.
Hence for the generic country i we have:
(5.5)
where the last term on the R.H.S. of (5.5) stands for a linear
penalty in public expenditure. Observe that for analytical simplicity
and in accordance with the mainstream literature (Calmfors 1998c,
Allsopp and Vines 1998) we have assumed that the cost of reform is
invariant to the choice of the monetary regIme
(y FA,i,EMU = Y FA,j,O = Y FA; Vi,}).
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The output function is given by the general function derived in
section (3.2) of this thesis. However, we add the extra term of reform to
identify any positive deviations from the steady state. This means that
for outsiders output is given by:
_ 1- V _ PI(1- V) [( )_ _]
Yi = XVffi + --Xff_i + ( ) n +m gi - s., +n+m n+m
+p2[(n+m)(g;f -(g-;f]- (1:)(ttf +~;
(5.6)
Conversely, for insiders we shall have:
y;EMU = XVI iiEMU + 1- V xmiio + PI(1- V) [(n +m)g; - g-i] +
n+m (n+m)
+p2[(n+m)(g;f -(g-;f]- (1:)(ttf +~;
(5.7)
Recall that VI = n +mV > V. This follows from the
n+m
counterproductive character of monetary policy co-ordination ill a
discretionary regime (Rogoff, 1985b). In fact, for a given degree of
conservatism of the monetary authority, absence of precommitment
has the effect of increasing the inflationary bias under a monetary
union. This is due to the fact that an inflation surprise is no longer
constrained by an exchange rate depreciation between members of the
union.
45 This chapter neglects the issues of credibility raised by McCallum (1995).
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Both (5.6) and (5.7) neglect supply shocks. This choice is motivated
by the desire to avoid unnecessary complications in the algebra.
Observe also that when 5=0 and m=O (5.7) collapses to the reduced
form for output (3.28).
We assume the sequence of events to be as follows:
1. labour market institutions (i.e. reforms) are determined;
2. money wages are set;
3. (*) Only for EMU countnes (Ins): Optimal penalty In public
expenditure is set;
4. fiscal and monetary authorities simultaneously and independently
set taxes and inflation.
5.3 Reforms under EMU
Let us start with EMU countries. The first order condition of the
ECB is found deriving (5.2) with respect to inflation. This yields:
(5.8)
(5.8) can be rearranged so as to get:
(5.9)
where 57EMU is equilibrium output, defined as:
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(5.10)
Observe that equilibrium output depends on the difference in the
fiscal biases of insiders and outsiders, when fiscal asymmetries are
assumed. In a balanced budget framework, this is captured by the term
I'zm(ttEMU - t:'o ). To understand why this is so we must recall that
fiscal policy in our model is beggar-tby-neighbour because it increases
domestic output at the expenses of other countries welfare.
While the ECB sets inflation, fiscal authorities simultaneously set
public expenditures. The optimal level of government spending is given
by:
(5.11)
from which it is straightforward to derive:
(5.12)
As expected, public expenditure is negatively affected by the linear
penalty Pi. This should be optimally chosen so as to induce fiscal
authorities to eliminate any deviations of tax distortions and public
expenditures from their equilibrium steady state values. Hence,
elimination of-fiscal commitment problems requires that the optimal
penalty in public expenditure be:
119
(5.13)
This means that, if p = p. :
(5.14)
Substituting (5.14) and (5.10) into (5.9) we get:
(5.15)
For a given level of central bank independence, the central bank
will choose to lower inflation whenever labour market reforms are
being implemented (s > 0). Observe that the actual inflation inside
EMU depends also on the overall level of distortionary taxation outside
the monetary union Oast term on the RHS of (5.15)). Such a level
depends in turn on the number of outsiders m.
We have now reached the final stage of our optimisation process.
The optimal amount of reform inside the monetary union is obtained
deriving the expected value of Ut2MU with respect to s. This gives:
(5.16)
where
120
-I - ~Y EMU = Y EMU - C-O;,EMU = -InP2' j.o (5.17)
It follows that:
(5.18)
5.4 Reform Outside EMU
Consider the generic country j which is outside the monetary
union. Computation of the first order condition for its monetary
authority yields:
-"7,CB
uv j,O ~--=1(. +bCYxv(y,- y)=ot3:r. J J
J
(5.19)
As before, we can rearrange (5.19) so as to get:
(5.20)
where
(5.21)
Conversely, the optimal choice of the tax instrument is given by:
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(5.22)
It is then straightforward to derive the equilibrium optimal level of
public expenditure. This is:
• • -( A -1 ~)g·o=t·o=a y-yo-c..o·r. r. j (5.23)
Combining (5.23) with (5.21) we can re-write public expenditure
(i.e. taxation) as:
g ~0 = t ~0 = a(y - c% .)s. j. j (5.24)
Therefore, substitution of (5.24) into (5.20) yields:
(5.25)
Observe that, when deciding on the optimal inflation rate, the
central bank of the generic outsider j internalises the positive spillover
effects on output deriving from the existence of relative price (open
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economy) fiscal effects. Therefore, for a given degree of central bank
independence and reforms, it will increase inflation only when output
tax distortions are greater that such relative pnce effects
In this modified scenario, the optimal amount of reforms is given
by:
(5.26)
(5.27)
5.5 Results
We can now compare reforms inside a monetary union with
limited fiscal discretionary power with reforms outside. Subtracting
(5.27) to (5.18) subject to (5.24), and assuming for simplicity that
bEeB = bCB we get that:
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(5.28)
The sign of (5.28) is uncertain and is given by:
The sign of (5.29) depends on a combination of the following three
factors:
1. Tax distortions outside the monetary union. The higher these are
(i.e. the higher a), the higher the incentives to reform facing the
outsiders;
2. Open economy effects from fiscal policy affecting the relative
exchange rate between ins and outs. Since fiscal policy in our ins &
outs model ts beggar-thy-neighbour and transmits negative
externalities via the exchange rate, the greater the externalities (i.e.
the more serious the commitment problem of governments outside
the monetary union), the higher the incentives to reform for the ins.
Observe that this occurs when ,Li2 * 0, i.e. when fiscal anticipated
effects matter as well as the fiscal surprises.
3. For a given degree of central bank independence, monetary time
inconsistencies are more severe inside monetary union ( recall that
lI/l > lI/). This contributes to higher reforms inside the union.
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exogenous. In this chapter we used an extended Barro-Gordon model of
inflation and public expenditure - in a framework where labour market
reform is endogenous - to analyse how monetary union in Europe is
likely to affect the amount of labour market reform. Our key
assumption is that labour-market institutions continue to be
determined nationally also when monetary policy is delegated to the
ECB. Once again our results depend on the relative strength of the
open-economy effects. When these are sufficiently strong, reforms are
likely to be higher under a monetary union than in countries
preserving the autonomy in the management of their macroeconomic
policies Conversely, when open-economy effects are negligible and the
number of outsiders becomes sufficiently large, than the opposite is
true. Hence, only under these very special circumstances, our results
are in line with the mainstream literature.
We conclude by sayIng that we find these results particularly
interesting. They In fact suggest that, once we depart from the
traditional assumption of absence of open-economy effects, rather
different implications about the incentives to reform under different
monetary policy arrangements may have to be derived.
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Chapter 6
Summary of the Main Results
and Conclusion
With eleven countnes )Oimng the EMU at the beginning of
January 1999,macroeconomic policy within Europe has been radically
transformed. This has gradually put aside the long debated and
controversial issue of the feasibility of a monetary union among
countries which do not form an optimal currency area. At the same
time, more attention has been devoted to find suitable ways to make
the system work smoothly in the future.
Given the fiscal anomaly that currently characterises the EMU
and the central role that fiscal policy has assumed in the meantime, in
this thesis we decided to investigate the desirability of fiscal policy co-
ordination within what appears to be a suddenly modified
macroeconomic policy framework. Specifically, we have concentrated
on the study of the fiscal and monetary policy interactions within the
stylised framework of a monetary union where the real exchange rate is
the only channel of policy transmission.
Trying to overcome the limits of ad hoc IS-LMmodels of monetary
policy in the traditional literature of time inconsistency, our analysis is
characterised by the derivation of demand and supply from
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microeconomic foundations as in Levine and Pearlman (1998) and the
endogenisation of domestic fiscal policies subject to an explicit balanced
budget constraint. Most importantly, we have introduced tax
distortions". A second distinguishing feature is the adoption of a
principal-agent approach to formalise the welfare implications of
precommitment devices for fiscal policy, of which the stability pact is
an example.
We started our analysis by setting up a relatively simple model
where policymakers decide monetary and fiscal policies simultaneously
and independently. The assumption that policymakers are unable to
precommit their policies to optimal future paths for inflation and
public expenditure implies, as we have seen, that both governments and
the central bank are subject to commitment problems. This means that,
in absence of fiscal policy co-ordination, equilibrium inflation and
public expenditures are excessively high. Moreover, tax financed
government spending in excess of the socially optimal level (i.e. the
expenditure bias) determines a significant spillover effect on inflation. It
follows that central bank independence by itself is not a sufficient
condition to secure low inflation when fiscal authorities behave
'irresponsibly' .
The main result of the model presented in chapter three is that co-
ordination of fiscal policies, by eliminating the fiscal commitment
problem, also mitigates the time inconsistency problem affecting the
monetary authorities. This naturally remains a second best scenario,
because the first best requires precommitment of all policymakers. We
46 There are taxes in L&P (1998) but these are assumed to be lump-sum in nature.
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also showed that a precommitment device imposing a linear penalty on
fiscal authorities with relatively looser fiscal stances - although
vulnerable to the McCallum critique - is a substitute for fiscal policy
co-ordination. Finally, our simulation results suggested that fiscal
policy co-ordination decreases the optimal ECB degree of conservatism.
This happens because, to the extent that national authorities engage in
excessively expansionary fiscal policies, the central bank will have to
pursue a tighter monetary policy in order to achieve its bliss point for
inflation.
Yet, a model based on the assumption of simultaneity of policy
decisions might be badly equipped to capture the real nature of the
fiscal and monetary policy interactions. In practice monetary and fiscal
policies seem to operate in different time frames, with monetary policy
adjusting almost on a continuous basis while fiscal policy taking a
longer time to adjust. This consideration induced us to think that,
although the structural nature of the game presented in chapter three is
substantially in line with the mainstream literature, it was worthwhile
to check how the results summarised above are affected when the
gaming sequence of the model is modified. In chapter four we have
therefore relaxed the traditional assumption of simultaneity in the
policy decision-making process and developed a modified model where
a particular choice for taxes provides fiscal authorities with a first-
mover advantage. From this perspective our model is similar to the one
developed by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998). However, modification of
the structural nature of the game did bring about more ambiguity in
the results. In fact, when fiscal policy is set before monetary policy is
decided, the fiscal policymaker defacto internalises the monetary policy
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response to its actions. This is perceived to be much stronger under
fiscal policy co-ordination because in this case fiscal authorities are able
to anticipate the full scale of the central bank response to the increased
level of tax distortions throughout the union. Hence, fiscal policy co-
ordination ends up strengthening the bargaining position of the fiscal
authorities vis Cl vis the central bank. This - that we shall call first effect
or B&B effect - stands as an issue against co-ordination. But there is a
second effect that has to be considered. When open-economy effects
from fiscal policy are introduced, fiscal policy non co-ordination entails
an overestimation of the impact on output of public expenditures
policies. Such an overestimation is bad because it creates incentives to
loosen the domestic fiscal stances. We showed that when this second
effect is sufficiently strong, fiscal policy co-ordination remains
desirable.
Overall, the conclusions that can be derived from chapters three
and four run counter to the view that decentralisation of fiscal policies
is necessarily conducive to both monetary and fiscal discipline, as
recently emphasised by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998). This is certainly
true for a scenario of simultaneous decisions for the reasons just
summarised. However, it may also be so if fiscal authorities behave as
Stackelberg leaders, when the perceived effects of public expenditure
policies are sufficiently strong. From this point of view, our analysis
bridges a gap between the mainstream literature favouring co-
ordination (Chari and Kehoe (1998), Sibert (1992), Levine and
Pearlman (1998), Beetsma and Uhlig (1997) among the many others)
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and the minority against it (Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) and more
recently Dixit and Lambertini (1999t~.
Yet, if our derived demand side-open economy effects were to be
empirically dominated by the B&B effect, the familiar credibility-versus-
flexibility dilemma (Lohmann (1992)) would be resurrected in the fiscal
policy domain. In fact optimal countercyclical policies call for fiscal co-
ordination" whereas decentralisation would generate on average lower
output distortions. Note, however, that without precommitment
systematic fiscal policies would still remain inefficient. To solve the
conundrum, European institutions would have to find ways to induce
national governments to precommit to public expenditure targets, and
allow for a flexible - and co-ordinated - use of tax policies in order to
stabilise the cycle. The analogy with the popular inflation targeting
proposal (Svensson (1997)) is obviously suggestive. A credible
expenditure target would impose more discipline than a deficit or a
debt ceiling, and would directly address the issue of fiscal distortions. It
is dubious whether, today, this goal can be achieved within the
framework of the Stability and Growth Pact. In fact, compliance with
deficit ceilings was not sufficient to induce structural reforms, whereas
the cyclical stance of fiscal policies remained too conservative given the
adverse international cycle.
47 They argue in favour of fiscal policy non co-ordination because this leaves the fiscal
authorities free to achieve their output target without constraints being imposed
upon them by external bodies. This is positive because, by increasing the output
level, it also reduces monetary time inconsistencies. This model however assumes that
only monetary authorities are subject to the time inconsistency problem. It would be
straightforward to show that their results would radically change if fiscal time
inconsistencies were to be introduced as in our model.
48 Observe that fiscal policy co-ordination when policies are not systematic is always
optimal because adverse effects on expectations do not materialise.
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Finally, chapter five started with the observation that time
inconsistency arises from the desire of policymakers to raise the level of
output above its suboptimal equilibrium level. In this framework, fiscal
policy co-ordination or various other institutional arrangements, while
reducing the amount of tax distortions, are not able to remove the
problem at its origin. From this perspective, institutional arrangements
discussed in chapters three and four, far from providing recipes on how
to mcrease an unsatisfactory low output level, simply mitigate the
policymakers' commitment problem by reducing governments'
temptation to use self-defeating policies. We have therefore decided to
make a step forward in the analysis and analysed how monetary union
in Europe is likely to affect incentives to reform. For this purpose we
have used an extended Barro-Gordon model of inflation and public
expenditure in a framework where labour market reform is
endogenously treated.
The results we obtained in chapter five are in line with those of the
mainstream literature only in the special case where open-economy
effects are small. More generally, the results are ambiguous and depend
on the interactions of a number of factors like the number of outsiders
and the nature of the commitment problems affecting policymakers
both inside and outside the monetary union. Our main result, however,
was to show that incentives to reforms are higher under EMU when
open-economy effects are sufficiently strong and the number of
outsiders is small.
We conclude with some thoughts about future developments for
our research. First, thorough the thesis, we have assumed that the main
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channel that governments are able to use for financing public
expenditure is the one of distortionary taxation. It would be
interesting to see how our results are affected when debt dynamics are
introduced. Another interesting development involves the analysis of
tax competition, likely to assume an important role when integration
between European economies becomes deeper. If this competition were
to assume a dominant effect, than the problem in Europe could be
exactly the opposite: the requirement to keep taxes lower than in other
countries could, at least in principle, imply a negative expenditure bias.
A third line of research - completely neglected in this thesis but
potentially very interesting - is the analysis of dynamic coalition
formation. It would be interesting to see how changing political parties
seeking re-election and coalitions between countries affect current
policy, particularly when the assumption of symmetry between
countries is relaxed. Finally, there are two ways in which we believe it
would be useful to develop the model presented in chapter five. One
way would be to modify its game theoretical structure so as to provide
a first-mover advantage to the fiscal authorities in a framework where
monetary policies continue to suffer from time-inconsistencies (i.e. as in
chapter four). It is reasonable to expect that these changes would
strengthen our results because uncoordinated governments will fail to
internalise the positive externalities that occur when a fall in
equilibrium unemployment induces a reduction in the common rate of
inflation. This analysis would be particularly useful if we believe that
the recent low inflation inside the EMU is a temporary phenomenon
and inflation bias problems are likely to remain in the future. A second
way to extend the model would be to incorporate some of the more
recent political economy research and treat the cost of reforms as
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endogenously determined, linked to the political fortunes to the
national parties or government coalitions. This may not prove to be an
easy task, but we believe that the exercise would be useful.
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Fig. 1.1
Public Deficit/GDP (1989-98)
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Fig. 1.2
Official Government Balance Forecasts (1999-2002)
per cent of GDP
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Fig. 1.3
Official Government Debt Forecasts (1999-2002)
per cent of CDP
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FIG.3.1
The Dynamics of Government Expenditure in Europe,
US and Japan
(as a per cent of GDP) (1969-1996)
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Table 3.1
Government Spending / GDP in the ED Countries
33.5 51.2 51.1 52 52 51
26.6 51.6 48.9 49.1 47.7 45.9
30.1 40.6 39.9 39.2 37.7 37.1
31.3 48.1 47.8 47.3 46.6 46.4
28.3 55.8 52.0 51.6 50.3 49.6
27.0 60.4 55.5 54.3 52.9 53.0
23.8 53.1 56.8 56 54.1 51.2
18.7 45.8 41.9 45.5 40.6 39.9
26.5 41.0 41.7 41.2 39.0 36.7
29.8 56.2 51.7 50.1 49.0 48.4
17.4 42.7 41.1 40.1 39.9 40.1
18.2 42.6 41.7 41.0 39.6 38.8
28.6 68.1 64.3 63.8 61.5 60.4
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Fig 3.2
Inflationary and Fiscal Bias under Fiscal Policy Co-
ordination (FPC) and Fiscal Policy Non Co-ordination
(FPNC)
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FIG.3.3
Welfare Loss and Optimal Degree of CBI under FPN C
(Case with Distortionary Tax)
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FIG.3.4
Welfare Loss and Optimal Degree of CBI under FPC
(with and without distortionary tax)
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FIG.3.5
Welfare Loss and Optimal Degree of CBI under FPNC
(Case without Distortionary Tax)
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Appendix lA
Key Provisions of the Maastricht Treaty
The Maastricht Treaty updates and incorporates the 1957 Treaty of
Rome, the founding Act of the European Community and the Single
Act implemented in 1992 (free movement of goods, people and capital).
The Treaty has been formally ratified by all member countries. With
the Maastricht Treaty, Europe ceases to be called the European
Community and becomes the European Union, which involves both
political and economic union. The economic component mainly
involves the adoption of a single currency, while the political one has
been left rather vague, hinting at an evolution towards joint defence
and foreign affairs.
The Treaty includes a detailed timetable for the adoption of a
single currency. It sets in motion a gradual convergence process which
is formally structured around three stages. The first begun in 1992 with
the formal ratification of the Treaty. During the second stage, which
started in January 1991, national central banks had to be given formal
independence and cease to grant direct loans to their nation's treasuries.
The shift to the second stage also coincided with the establishment of
the European Monetary Institute, with two main functions. One was to
prepare the creation of the European Central Bank. The other function
was to oversee the convergence criteria used to decide which countries
were ready to enter the monetary union at the beginning of stage three.
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This has been scheduled to start in January 1999 with the official
delegation of domestic monetary policies to the ECB and will end with
the introduction of the single currency - the euro - by the year 2002.
• Convergence Criteria
The underlying notion of the convergence criteria is that unless
countries enter the single currency with similar inflation rates and fiscal
positions, the single currency will be unsustainable. Therefore, all
countries willing to join EMU have to satisfy five convergence criteria.
Three conditions deal with monetary convergence:
• The inflation rate of any country joining the single currency must be
within 1.5 percentage points of the average of the three lowest rates
in Europe;
• The long term interest rate in a country joining the single currency
must not exceed more than two percentage points the average rates
observed in the three countries with the lowest inflation;
• The exchange rate must have remained within the normal bands of
the existing EMS without severe tensions for at least two years;
Finally, two other criteria concern fiscal policy:
• The ratios of debt/GDP and deficit/GDP do not have to exceed 60
and 3 per cent respectively.
However, the Treaty does leave room for some flexible
interpretation of these last two criteria: in fact, if the countries show a
sufficient and rapid convergence towards the reference parameters, they
can still qualify for monetary union.
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Appendix IB
Monetary Policy and Institutional Provision
Abstracts from the Treaty of Maastricht (Chapters 2&3)
CHAPTER 2: MONETARY POLICY
ARTICLE 105
1. The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintam pnce
stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the
ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the
Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the
objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2. The ESCB
shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market
economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of
resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article
3a.
2. The basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB shall be:
• to define and implement the monetary policy of the Community;
• to conduct foreign exchange operations consistent with the
provisions of Article 109;
• to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the Member
States;
• to promote the smooth operation of payment systems.
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3. The third indent of paragraph 2 shall be without prejudice to the
holding and management by the government of Member States of
foreign exchange working balances.
4. The ECB shall be consulted:
• on any proposed Community act in its fields of competence;
• by national authorities regarding any draft legislative provision in its
fields of competence, but within the limits and under the
conditions set out by the Council in accordance with the procedure
laid down in Article 106(6).
The ECB may submit opmlOns to the appropnate Community
institutions or bodies or to national authorities on matters in its fields
of competence.
5. The ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies
pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial
system.
6. The Council may, actmg unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting the ECB and after receiving the
assent of the European Parliament, confer upon the ECB specific
tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of
credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception
of insurance undertakings.
ARTICLE 10Sa
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1. The ECB shall have the exclusive right to authorise the issue of bank
note within the Community. The ECB and the national central
banks may issue such notes. The bank notes issued by the ECB and
the national central banks shall be the only such notes to have the
status of legal tender within the Community.
2. The Member States may issue coins subject to approval by the ECB
of the volume of the issue. The Council may, acting in accordance
with the procedure referred to in Article 189c and after consulting
the ECB, adopt measures to harmonise the denominations and
technical specifications of all coins intended for circulation to the
extent necessary to permit their smooth circulation within the
Community.
ARTICLE 106
1. The ESCB shall be composed of the ECB and of the national central
banks.
2. The ECB shall have legal personality.
3. The ESCB shall be governed by the decision-making bodies of the
ECB which shall be the Governing Council and the Executive
Board.
ARTICLE 107
When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties
conferred upon them by this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB,
neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their
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decision-making bodies shall seek or take instrucnons from
Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member
State or from any other body. The Community institutions and bodies
and the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this
principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-
making bodies of the ECB or of the national central banks in the
performance of their tasks.
ARTICLE 108
Each Member State shall ensure, at the latest at the date of the
establishment of the ESCB, that its national legislation including the
statutes of its national central bank is compatible with this Treaty and
the Statute of the ESCB.
ARTICLE 109
1. By way of derogation from Article 228, the Council may, actmg
unanimously on a recommendation from the ECB or from the
Commission, and after consulting the ECB in an endeavour to reach
a consensus consistent with the objective of price stability, after
consulting the European Parliament, in accordance with the
procedure in paragraph 3 for determining the arrangements,
conclude formal agreements on an exchange rate system for the
ECU in relation to non-Community currencies. The Council may,
acting by a qualified majority on a recommendation from the ECB
or from the Commission, and after consulting the ECB in an
endeavour to reach a consensus consistent with the objective of price
stability, adopt, adjust or abandon the central rates of the ECU
within the exchange rate system. The President of the Council shall
150
inform the European Parliament of the adoption, adjustment or
abandonment of the ECU central rates.
2. In the absence of an exchange rate system in relation to one or more
non- Community currencies as referred to in paragraph 1, the
Council, acting by a qualified majority either on a recommendation
from the Commission and after consulting the ECB or on a
recommendation from the ECB, may formulate general orientations
for exchange-rate policy in relation to these currencies. These general
orientations shall be without prejudice to the primary objective of
the ESCB to maintain price stability.
CHAPTER 3: INSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
ARTICLE 109a
1. The Governing Council of the ECB shall comprise the members of
the Executive Board of the ECB and the Governors of the national
central banks.
2. (a) The Executive Board shall compnse the President, the vice-
president and four other members. (b) The President, the vice-
president and the other members of the Executive Board shall be
appointed from among the persons of recognised standing and
professional experience in monetary or banking matters by common
accord of the Governments of the Member States at the level of
Heads of State or of Government, on a recommendation from the
Council, after it has consulted the European Parliament and the
Governing Council of the ECB. Their term of office shall be eight
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years and shall not be renewable. Only nationals of Member States
may be members of the Executive Board.
ARTICLE 109b
1. The President of the Council and a member of the Commission may
participate, without having the right to vote, in meetings of the
Governing Council of the ECB. The President of the Council may
submit a motion for deliberation to the Governing Council of the
ECB.
2. The President of the ECB shall be invited to participate in Council
meetings when the Council is discussing matters relating to the
objectives and tasks of the ESCB.
3. The ECB shall address an annual report on the activities of the
ESCB and on the monetary policy of both the previous and current
year to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission,
and also to the European Council. The President of the ECB shall
present this report to the Council and to the European Parliament,
which may hold a general debate on that basis. The President of the
ECB and the other members of the Executive Board may, at the
request of the European Parliament or on their own initiative, be
heard by the competent Committees of the European Parliament.
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Appendix lC
Key provisions of the European Council Resolution on
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
Member States
1. Commit themselves to respect the medium-term budgetary position
of close to balance or in surplus set out in the stability or
convergence programmes;
2. Will correct excessrve deficits as quickly as possible after their
emergence; this correction should be completed in the year
following its identification, unless there are special circumstances;
3. Commit themselves not to invoke the benefit of Art. 2 par. 3 of the
Council Regulation on speeding up and clarifying the excessive deficit
procedure unless they are in severe recession; in evaluating whether the
economic downturn is severe, the Member States will, as a rule, take as
a reference point an annual fall in real GDP of at least 0.75%.
The Commission
1. Commits itself to prepare a report under Art. 104c(3) whenever
there is the risk of an excessive deficit or whenever the planned or
actual deficit exceeds the 3% of GDP reference value.
2. Commits itself, in the event that it considers that a deficit exceeding
3% is not excessive and this opinion differs from that of the
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Economic and Financial Committee, to present in writing to the
Council the reasons for its position;
3. Commits itself, following a request from the Council under Art.
l09d, to make, as a rule, a recommendation for a Council decision on
whether an excessive deficit exists under Art. l04c(6);
The Council
1. is invited to impose sanctions if a participating Member State fails to
take the necessary steps to bring the excessive deficit situation to an
end;
2. Is urged to always require a non-interest bearing deposit, whenever
sanctions on a participating Member State are agreed in accordance
with Art. l04c(11);
3. Is urged always to convert a deposit into a fine after two years, unless
the excessive deficit has been corrected.
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Appendix 3A
Punishment" 'A la Walsh"
If the fiscal authorities know that they will be punished when they
spend too much, they will take account of this when calculating their
first order condition. This means that endogenisation of a linear
penalty in public expenditure in the welfare function of the fiscal
authorities modifies their first order condition as follows:
(3.Al)
Rewriting the above expression only in terms of deterministic
components we get:
(3.A2)
from which we derive:
(3.A3)
Hence, when p is p = bFAf.i1 (1- V)y the spending bias is zero. This
means that an optimal punishment rule exists that eliminates the time
inconsistency problem of the fiscal authorities.
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Appendix 3B
Simulation Programs
(Software Used:Matlab, version 4.2c.1)
%=====================================
%A CASE FOR FISCAL POLICY CO-ORDINA TION
% SIMULATION MAIN -PROGRAM
% CASE ONE: FISCAL POLICY NON CO-ORDINA TION
% WIT H DISTORTIONARY TAXES
%
%=====================================
%
%GLOBAL VARIABLES
%
global rho sigma ncount mu cweight phi bm beta epsi kappa alp gam2 yhat
%
%FUNDAMENTAL PARAMETERS
%
cweight=5;
ncount=10;
n=ncount;
kappa =0.5;
beta=0.3;
c=0.6;
gr=0.2;
%
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% **lhat=NRU>:-*
%
Ihat=5;
yhat=(l-beta}. *lhat;
%
% **pibar=in/lationary bias?"
%
pibar=5;
sigmau+B;
%
%DERIVED PARAMETERS
%
mu = l./(l-gr)+(l-beta}./beta;
alp=c. *mu;
gaml =l/(n+l);
epsi=(l-kappa). *(l-beta)./beta;
sigma =sigmau./beta;
gam2=gaml
x=alp+gam2. *(l-beta}./beta;
y=alp+in+l]. *gam2. *(l-beta}./beta;
phi=x./y;
bm =pibar./(epsi. *phi. *yhat)
%
% ******* loop *******
%
for i=1:11
rho=(l + 1.O./n}./lO.O. *(i-l)-l.O./n;
cor(i)= rho;
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options =foptions
OPTIONS(14)=2000
%
%
bu =fmin('SUB2',0,5,OPTIONS)
cbi(lj= bmlbu;
bbu(lj=bu;
wloss(lj=SUB2{bu);
end
%
%
% PLOTS
subplot(2, 1,1)
plot(cor, wloss, '-')
xlabel('CORRELA TION COEFFICIENT')
ylabel('WELFARE LOSS ')
% title('FIG. 1 WELFARE LOSS,)
subplot(2, 1,2)
plot(cor,cbi, ':')
xlabel('CORRELA TION COEFFICIENT,)
ylabel(,DEGREE OF CONSER VA TISM')
% title(,FIG. 2 OPTIMAL DEGREE OF CBI')
axis([-.1,1,0,20j)
% for casewithout tax replace last line with
% axis([-.1,1,0,10j)
%
%=====================================
% SUB-PROGRAM 2
158
% FISCAL POLICY NON CO-ORDINA TION
%
%=====================================
%
function y=SUB2(bu)
global rho sigma ncount mu cweight phi bm beta epsi kappa alp gam2 yhat
n=ncount;
r=rho;
p=phi;
s=szgma;
cm =cweight;
zigzag=bm. *mu. "[l-phi). *(l-beta)'/beta;
nurngbar=brn. *mu. *yhat. *(l-ph~;
dengbar =cweight-zigzag;
gbar= numgbar./ dengbar;
u=(1.-beta)./(l +bu. "epsi.A2);
%
%now we write the deterministic component
yl=bm+bu.A2. *epsi.A2;
ylbis=(yhat+(l-beta)'/beta. *gbar)'A2;
detcom=yl, *ylbis+cweight. *gbar.A2;
%
%
% The stocastic component is as before
% and below calculated
%
y2=u. A2./(1 +n). "Yl +n. "r}."s.A2 ;
stocorn=y l. *y2;
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somma = detcom +stocom
Z= l.1(alp+(l-beta).lbeta);
den=(l =bmc/cm. "{l-alp. *z).*(l-p)*mu. A2). A2;
num = bm. *((-alp.'~z)+beta).A2+(mu. *bm. '~(beta-(alp.,:·z)).*(l-p)).A2.1cm;
z2 = num.i/. den;
y=somma+z2. *n.l(n+l). "(l-r}. '~s.A2;
%
%=====================================
%
%A CASE FOR FISCAL POLICY CO-ORDlNA TION
% WIT H DISTOR TIONARY TA XES
% SIMULATION MAIN-PROGRAM
%
%CASE ]WO: FISCAL POLICY CO-ORDINATION
%
%=====================================
%
%GLOBAL VARIABLES
%
global rho sigma ncount mu cweight phi bm beta epsi kappa alp gam2 yhat
%
%FUNDAMENTAL PARAMETERS
%
cweight=5;
ncount=10;
n=ncount;
kappa=O.5;
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beta=0.3;
c=0.6;
gr=0.2;
%
% **lhat=NR U**
%
Ihat=5;
ybat=il-beta). *lhat;
%
% **pibar=inflationary bias':"
%
pibar=5;
sigmau=3;
%
%DERIVED PARAMETERS
%
mu =1./(I-gr)+(I-beta}./beta;
alp=«: *mu;
gami =1/(n+I);
epsi= (I-kappa). "[l-beta)./beta;
sigma =sigmau./beta;
gam2=gaml
x=alp+gam/Z. *(I-beta}./beta;
y=alp+In+l}: *gam2. *(I-beta}./beta;
phi=x./y;
bm =pibar./(epsi. *phi.*yhat)
%
% *******loop *******
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%for t-t.u
rbo=i l + 1.O'/n)'/lO.O. *(i-l)-1.0./n;
cor(i)=rho;
options =foptions
OPTIONS(14)=2000
%
%
bu=fmin('SUBl',O,5,OPTIONS)
cbi(i)= bm/bu;
bbu(i)=bu;
wloss(i)=SUBl{bu);
end
%
% PL 0 TS
%
subplot(2, I, I)
plot(cor, wloss, '-')
xlabel('CORRELA TION COEFFICIENT,)
ylabel(' WELFARE LOSS,)
%title(,FIG. 1 WELFARE LOSS,)
subplot(2,1,2)
plot(cor,cbi, ':')
xlabel('CORRELA TION COEFFICIENT,)
ylabel(,DEGREE OF CONSER VA TISM')
%title('FIG. 2 OPTIMAL DEGREE OF CBI')
axis([-.1,1,O,10j)
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%%=====================================
% SUB-PROGRAM 1
%
% FISCAL POLICY CO-ORDINATION
%
%=====================================
%
function y=SUB1(bu)
global rho sigma ncount mu cweight phi bm beta epsi kappa alp gam2 yhat
n+ncount;
r=rho;
p-spbi;
s=szgma;
cm =cweight;
u=(l.-beta)./(l +bu. *epsi.A2);
y1 =bm+bu.A2. *epsi.A2;
y2=yhat. A2+u. A2./(1 +n). *(1+n. *r).*s.A2;
y=y1. *y2;
Z= l./(alp+(l-beta)./beta);
den=l+Ibm. *mu.A2./cm). "[l-alp. *z).A2;
num =bm. *(alp.*z-beta).A 2;
z2=num./den;
y=y+z2. *n./(n+l). "(l-r). *s.A2;
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Appendix 4A
Extended Model with Seignorage
This appendix shows how results set out in section 4.3 are affected
by the introduction of seignorage.
Let us assume that the n+1governments run balanced budgets and
finance public expenditures either by raising taxation, or via the
traditional seignorage channel. We can then rewrite (4.2)as:
(4Al)
Welfare functions and output remain the same as in section 4.3.
Solving the game by backward induction and recalling the output
definition (4.13), the central bank reaction function is:
1 { 1 n }J[ = J[e + -- L (t()
1+ a"", n + 1 ;=1
(4.A2)
This is identical to (4.14). Conversely, on the fiscal side in absence
of co-ordination we now have:
(4.A3)
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where:
mr ---_
d] (l+amn)n+1
(4.A4)
(4.AS)
Combining (4.Al)-(4.AS) and (4.13), we get:
t ~.FPNC = a.;_gsg......A[ _1_+_a_mn_+_k_;_/_;_(n_+ 1..:....d)]L ,_-=-- ___
, _( 1 )(anj -1)+(1+amn)(1-c)+ags(1+_!_)[1+amn+_k_]n+l amn amn (n+1)
(4.A6)
Conversely, co-ordination of fiscal policies yields:
-=
mr 1
(4.A7)
de. mr 1
-' =-1+-=-1+---
at at (1+ amn)
(4.A8)
from which follows that:
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t,v,FPC = agsg(l+ amn + k)
I (:: -l)+(l+amn)+ags(l+ a:)(1+amn+k)
(4.A9)
Subtracting (4.A9) from (4.A6) we get that the slgn of the tax
difference is given by:
(4.A10)
When c= 0 the results coincide with those of Beetsma and
Bovenberg (1998). However, when c:;toO the trade off described in
section 4.3 reappears. The presence of seignorage worsens the output
effects of co-ordination on one hand because it creates additional
incentives for the fiscal authorities to increase distortionary taxation.
This in fact relaxes the government's budget constraint. On the other
hand, it also creates additional incentives to engage in public
expenditure surprises when fiscal policies are not co-ordinated.
Observe also that the existence of seignorage implies that the neutrality
of co-ordination - as derived in B&B - when open economy effects from
fiscal policy are absent and the central bank is non-conservative will no
longer apply. in Fact, when k:;to 0 the tax difference is always negative.
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